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Conflict between nature and veterinary policy 
In 2003, the Large Herbivore Foundation (LHF) approached the Science Shop for Biology 
with a request to explore the conflicts between the EU veterinary legislation and LHF’s 
core activity: nature restoration, involving introduction, conservation and reintroduction of 
large herbivores. Herbivores like deer and bovine species, and rooting omnivores like wild 
boar play an important role in shaping and maintaining natural landscapes. The EU aims 
at the creation and where necessary restoration of large interconnected nature reserves, 
where wild populations find a natural habitat and can maintain themselves without 
interference by humans. This goal is often frustrated by veterinary rules, which were 
designed for farm animals and don’t take wildlife and nature conservation issues into 
account. Specifically, nature restoration with originally domestic species in a process of 
de-domestication, which are employed as ecological surrogate for once endemic but now 
extinct or endangered species like wild horse, aurochs, wild sheep and bison, are under 
the same rule as farm animals.  
In this report, the problems veterinary policy incurs to EU’s nature policy are studied, with 
a special emphasis to transmission risks of infectious animal diseases between wildlife 
and livestock. This is done by reviewing Foot and Mouth Disease and Classical Swine 
Fever. The worst conflicts between conservationists and veterinary authorities have to do 
with these two diseases. They are both capable of causing massive epidemics, running 
havoc amongst susceptible farm animals. Controlling an outbreak involves the killing and 
destruction of all infected and in-contact animals. Recent epidemics of Classical Swine 
Fever and Foot and Mouth Disease resulted in the mass destruction of millions of healthy 
animals, causing public outrage. Not only production animals were killed, but also pets and 
animals kept for hobby or recreational purposes. Valuable animals, including endangered 
species were in danger of extermination. Yet, protective vaccination was out of the 
question, because of trade interests. For the public, this was hard to understand, because 
vaccination could have saved a lot of animals.  
 
Infection risks 
We reviewed the literature using the following key questions: 
(1) What are the major transmission routes of the disease and how are they to be 
ranked in order of importance? 
(2) What do we know about transmission risks between livestock and wild or free-
roaming domestic populations? 
(3) What measures are available to prevent and control disease outbreak and how do 
they interfere with nature conservation, restoration and management?  
(4) How can control and prevention measures be adapted so as to better serve nature 
management with large herbivores as well as the protection of wild species? 
 
For Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) it was found, that the major transmission routes are 
direct contact between infected and susceptible animals in the short range and airborne 
transmission over long distances. The latter, plus the fact that a great many species are 
susceptible makes FMD very hard to control. Primary outbreaks however, are almost 
invariably caused by illegal import of infected animals or their products, often followed by 
illegal feeding them to farm animals. There is no record of primary outbreaks caused by 
wildlife, and most transmissions between wildlife and livestock are from farm animals to 
wildlife, not the reverse. After eradication among farm animals, FMD naturally disappears 
from infected wild populations. As for prevention and control measures, from an ecological 
point of view it is best to have the disease run its course, should wild populations be 
infected. Endemic diseases like FMD and Classical Swine Fever have an important 





possible, either as a measure to suppress the disease and to quickly halt the epidemic, or 
to protect them from infection. In the first case, vaccinated animals will be killed 
afterwards, in the second case, there is a risk that vaccinated animals become carriers, 
which mean that they don’t show symptoms but can transmit the infection. From a nature 
point of view, the best option is to isolate susceptible farm animals from wildlife. Ring 
vaccination of farm animals around nature reserves is an option in case of an outbreak. 
For endangered species, vaccination of wildlife should be considered. Monitoring wildlife 
for infectious diseases can be done in a non-invasive way and is an important tool. 
 
Classical Swine Fever (CSF) affects only swine and is not capable of airborne long 
distance transmission. Main transmission route involves direct contact with infected 
animals or meat. Most primary outbreaks are caused by (illegal) feeding infected meat or 
swill (kitchen and restaurant waste) to domestic pigs. In a few places in Europe, CSF is 
endemic in boar populations. Depending on the strain, it can become endemic, which has 
happened in Sardinia. Yet, like FMD, in most places where CSF has been eradicated from 
domestic pigs, it disappeared from wild boar as well. During an outbreak, for wildlife it is 
best to follow the same course as in FMD. Where CSF is endemic in wild boar, good farm 
hygiene and prevention of direct contact are the best precautions. For the purpose of 
eradication of CSF from wild boar populations, oral vaccination sometimes has been 
successfully employed. Lowering the population density, in order to slow the spread of 
infection, and make it die out, has been considered but involves practical problems. 
Hunting is counterproductive in most cases. Monitoring is very important, because wild 
boar can carry CSF. 
 
Disease policy 
A leading role is played by the OIE, the World Organisation for Animal Health. OIE sets 
out guidelines to minimize veterinary risk from trade in animals and animal products. The 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), of which the EU is member, follows the guidelines from 
OIE and so does the EU. WTO prohibits protectionism and wants to eliminate trade 
barriers as far as possible. A disease-free status without vaccination is the most desirable 
from a trade point of view, because then trade obstacles are lowest. Countries are 
reluctant to vaccinate, because loss of trade status causes huge economic losses. After 
the 2001 FMD epidemic, both OIE and EU mitigated the rules for emergency vaccination, 
because it can help to control an epidemic more quickly. Where emergency or protective 
vaccination is applied, consequences for trade status have been limited as compared to 
the 2001 situation. Also OIE recognizes the need to develop animal welfare guidelines, not 
only for domestic animals, but also for wildlife. 
While this is an improvement, nature conservation and ecosystem health have not been 
recognized as issues in their own right, and a co-responsibility of veterinarian authorities.  
It is recommended that nature conservation organisations support the EU’s and OIE’s 
long-term goal of eradication of FMD, despite the fact that it is an endemic disease with an 
ecological role in wild populations. Modern farming systems are too vulnerable for 
diseases as contagious as FMD. Perhaps it is possible to maintain the ecological role of 
CSF to regulate boar density in large nature reserves, provided that the wild boar can be 
effectively isolated from domestic pigs. A precondition is, that in case of an outbreak 
corridors have to be closed off completely. In general, isolation of wildlife from domestic 
animals is important, given the transmission risk of infectious animal diseases, including 
non-endemic diseases like African Swine fever to wild populations from domestic 
livestock. 
Vaccinated animals are usually killed afterwards, as vaccination is usually applied to halt 
an epidemic, not to save the vaccinated animals. After the 2001 FMD outbreak however, 
OIE and EU permitted protective vaccination for endangered species, but under very strict 
conditions, for which most animals living in the wild don’t qualify. There is no valid reason 





protective vaccination, as long as they don’t enter the food chain. From a conservationist 
point of view, the provisions OIE and EU have made for wildlife are not sufficient. They 
could be made less severe, without increasing transmission risk.  
To encourage protective vaccination, it is necessary to diminish the economic penalties for 
this course of action. Main trade restrictions for veterinary reasons concern the trade in 
live animals. Given the frequency of outbreaks of priority diseases, it might be desirable to 
limit trade and transport of live animals in both vaccinated and non-vaccinated disease-
free zones. It might be useful to re-examine the justification for trade barriers in the light of 
the current state of affairs and to take also into account other developments, such as the 












In 2003, the Large Herbivore Foundation (LHF) approached the Science Shop for Biology 
with a request to explore the conflicts between the EU veterinary legislation and LHF’s 
core business: nature restoration, involving introduction, conservation and reintroduction of 
large herbivores. The Large Herbivore Foundation (LHF) was initiated by World Wildlife 
Fund International in 1998. As a project with the aim to form an independent network 
organization it was to give special attention to the conservation and restoration of Large 
Herbivore communities in the Eurasian nature. Focus of the programme is not just on the 
over 45 large herbivore species in temperate Eurasia, but also on the specific key role 
large herbivores play in ecosystems and the significance they have for the public. 
Large herbivores have a key role in shaping and maintaining natural landscapes (Kuiters 
et al. 1996). Increasingly, such species are introduced, or reintroduced, in nature 
conservation and restoration areas, in order to achieve a more natural situation. They play 
a role in the dispersal of seeds, nutrient dispersal, and disturbance by trampling and 
species-specific grazing effects on the terrain.  
The EU aims at the creation and where necessary, restoration of large interconnected 
nature reserves, where wild populations find a natural habitat and can maintain 
themselves without interference by humans. Often employed in nature conservation and 
restoration projects are hardened domestic species like Icelandic ponies and Scottish 
Highlander cattle, as well as species specifically bred to resemble wild ancestors, like 
Konik horses and Heck cattle, as ecological surrogates for once endemic but now extinct 
or endangered species. Veterinary rules however, have been tailored to agricultural 
activities, and do not take into account the different set of conditions for grazers in restored 
or natural landscapes. 
 
In this report, the problems veterinary policy incurs to the EU’s nature policy are studied, 
with a special emphasis to transmission risks of priority diseases between wildlife and 
livestock.  
 
Controversies between veterinary and nature 
policy 
Cromsigt (2001) has reviewed the problems posed by veterinary law to the introduction, 
keeping and conservation of wild and domestic herbivores in nature reserves. For wild and 
protected species, main problems are connected with transport, quarantine and 
identification requirements that enter into force whenever animals are transported. 
Transport of wild species, often over national borders, is inevitable, both with regard to 
reintroduction in their natural habitats, and because the local populations are not large 
enough to avoid inbreeding. Provisions, required for transport and pens for temporary 
housing and quarantine are often inadequate for wild species, where identification 
requirements are a source of considerable practical problems with wild animals. A second 
formidable problem is posed by rules concerning prevention and control of infectious 
diseases. Measures may include extermination of local populations, including protected 
species, even when kept in a zoo. Moreover, the presence of certain infectious diseases in 
wild populations may cost a nation its disease-free status, bringing about significant 
economic losses due to trade restrictions. Large, interconnected nature areas, allowing 
populations to cross-breed, as envisaged in EU nature policy, stand little chance of being 
realized, as long as they endanger a country’s disease-free status. 
Employing (originally) domestic species as substitutes for extinct or hard to come by wild 
species entails a host of veterinary complications. By default, domestic species, even if 
specifically bred as a reconstruction of extinct ancestors, like Heck cattle and Konik horse, 
fall under the same rule as domestic species kept for agricultural purposes, including 





carcasses have to be removed, which interferes with nature conservation goals for carrion 
eaters like vultures and ravens. 
Individual identification of free-roaming animals poses huge practical problems, including 
stress to the animals and undesirable human interference in populations, which are meant 
to fend for themselves. Animal welfare rules, while not applicable to free-roaming wild 
species, do apply to domestic species, regardless the way they are kept. Under the law, 
they have to be fed and given medical care. Achieving a natural situation, where the 
population fulfils its role in the ecosystem, the same way a wild population does, is then 
impossible. To add more complications to this already difficult issue, it should be noted, 
that there is a whole spectrum, ranging from regular farming practice to 100% wildlife-like 
settings, in the way ‘domestic’ species are kept. In case of an outbreak of a priority 
disease, they may have to be killed as part of the control strategy. Also truly wild species 
run the risk of being killed and destroyed for veterinary reasons (Cromsigt, 2001). 
 
Policy context 
Veterinary laws serve both disease control and animal well-being. Disease control serves 
economic interests as well as animal well-being and human health. Countries can impose 
trade restrictions on animals and animal products for veterinary reasons. In general, the 
EU and the World Trade Organization, of which the EU is a member, are opposed to trade 
restrictions. OIE (Office International des Epizooties) is the World Organization for Animal 
Health It has the same position to animal health as the WHO (World Health Organization) 
has to human health. WTO has in its rules, that it follows OIE, and so does the EU (OIE, 
2005, www.oie.int). 
Guidelines concerning listed diseases of herbivores are set out in the Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code (OIE, 2004). OIE has since May 2004 changed its system, replacing the 
different classifications of animal diseases (list A, B, C etc) by one single list. 
A listed disease complies with one or more of the following criteria 
 
  
Basic criteria Parameters (at least one 'yes' answer means that the 
criterion has been met) 
International 
spread 
Has international spread been proven on three or more 
occasions? OR 
 
Are more than three countries with populations of 
susceptible animals free of the disease or facing impending 
freedom (based on the Terrestrial Code provisions, 
especially Appendix 3.8.1)? OR 
 
Do OIE annual reports indicate that a significant number of 
countries with susceptible populations have reported 




Does the disease exhibit significant mortality at the level of 
a country or zone/compartment? AND/OR 
 
Does the disease exhibit significant morbidity at the level of 
a country or zone/compartment? 
Zoonotic potential Has transmission to humans been proven? (with the 
exception of artificial circumstances) AND 
 
Is human infection associated with severe consequences? 
(death or prolonged illness) 
Emerging diseases Is there rapid spread and/or apparent zoonotic properties? 
 





For each listed disease, OIE members are required to take ‘adequate measures’ for 
prevention and control, which may differ, according to the region. The Terrestrial Code 
provides guidelines per disease. Outbreaks and suspicions of outbreaks have to be 
notified to the regional veterinary administration. For some diseases, there exist regional 
or even global eradication programmes, aimed at attaining a disease-free status for the 
whole region.  
 
Official disease-free status 
‘Since the early 1990s, the OIE has been given by the International Committee, composed of the Delegates of the OIE 
Member Countries, the responsibility of compiling a list of Member Countries or zones that are officially recognised as 
being free from certain diseases. For this purpose, a clearly defined and impartial procedure for declaring a Member 
Country free from a disease was necessary, accompanied by well-designed, science-based questionnaires. 
In May 1995 a new procedure was adopted by the International Committee. Developed by the Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) and Other Epizootics Commission (now called the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases), which is elected 
by the International Committee, it permitted the OIE to examine in detail dossiers submitted by the Delegates of 
Member Countries in support of a claim that their countries or zones within their countries could be considered free of 
FMD in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 2.2.10. of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (FMD was the first 
disease chosen in the light of its significance for international trade). 
In 1996 the first official list of OIE Member Countries or zones that were FMD free without using vaccination was 
published after adoption by the International Committee. 
While this mechanism applied to the recognition of national FMD status, the International Committee next recognised 
the need to apply the procedure to rinderpest and other diseases deemed to be of priority. To date, the OIE has a 
specific procedure for FMD, rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP). The conditions that apply to 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) are close to being adopted. 
Official OIE recognition of the absence of certain diseases, if the case arises, with or without the use of vaccines is 
essential to OIE Member Countries that engage in international trade. 
Member Countries can also declare themselves free of diseases for which there is, as yet, no specific procedure for 
obtaining Official OIE recognition of Member Country status. In this case, they must provide the relevant 
epidemiological information to importing countries in proof of their position. The data provided must conform to the 
standard measures contained in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, which is recognised by the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).’ 
 
(Source: OIE, www.oie.int) 
 
 
The OIE only has a legally binding protocol for a disease-free status for FMD, rinderpest 
and CBPP (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia), with a protocol for BSE coming soon. 
For other listed diseases, it offers guidelines, concerning a disease-free status and the 
requirement of animals and products offered for trade. EU and its major trade partners try 
to maintain a disease-free status for quite a few diseases. In practice, the former List A of 
OIE is a list of diseases on a programme of regional eradication and guidelines of OIE are 
quite authoritative. In the EU, animal health is the responsibility of the European 
Commission, specifically the Directorate General SANCO, consumer affairs and public 
health, while nature conservation and biodiversity belongs to DG Environment. The 
website of the European Commission provides information and contact details of 
responsible agencies and advisory committees within DG Sanco. 
OIE guidelines are frequently reviewed and modified according to scientific advice in 
several areas. The OIE has three permanent working groups, on wildlife diseases, on 
animal welfare and on food safety, and it can appoint ad hoc working groups to address 
specific issues. The Animal Welfare Working Group is aware of the ethical dilemmas 
concerning wildlife and protected species. It is interested in contributions of stakeholders 
to their discussions, including animal welfare organizations and nature conservation 
groups. The Wildlife Diseases Working Group is primarily occupied with surveillance of 
wildlife disease and development of guidelines for management of wildlife diseases (OIE, 
2002). Recently, they have established links with the IUCN and with the World Association 
of Wildlife Veterinarians, which may indicate that they are ready to adopt a wider 







The objective of this study 
The Large Herbivore Foundation and likeminded organizations call for a veterinary policy 
that also serves the interest of nature conservation, i.e. allows for the co-existence of wild 
and semi-wild free-roaming populations with domestic animals. At the root of the many 
problems reviewed by Cromsigt (2001) lies the transmission risk of infectious animal 
diseases between wildlife and livestock.  
The objective of this study is to explore the possibilities of a more nature-friendly disease 
prevention and control strategy with respect to the risks of infectious diseases. This has 
been elaborated for two cases, foot and mouth disease and classical swine fever.  
 
Key questions in this respect are: 
1 What are the major transmission routes of the disease and how are they to be 
ranked in order of importance? 
2 What do we know about transmission risks between livestock and wild or free-
roaming domestic populations? 
3 What measures are implemented to prevent and control disease outbreak and 
how do they interfere with nature conservation, restoration and management?  
4 How can control and prevention measures be adapted so as to better serve nature 
management with large herbivores as well as the protection of wild species? 
 
In the first introductory chapter background information is given about infectious animal 
diseases. In chapter 2 available control and prevention strategies are discussed, with 
special emphasis on the wildlife/ livestock interface. The above key questions are 
addressed in the next two chapters involving case studies on Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) and Classical Swine Fever (CSF). Both diseases used to be classified by OIE as 
List A, but only for FMD there is an official OIE protocol regarding a country’s or region’s 
disease-free status. In the concluding chapter, the results are discussed in a more general 







1 Infectious Animal Diseases 
 
1.1 Introduction 
An infectious animal disease is usually caused by external factors such as parasitism. 
Parasitism is a condition in which two organisms live together, one deriving its 
nourishment at the expense of the other. Parasitic organisms belong to a wide range of 
taxonomic groups. A heavy load of parasites is an infection and a disease is the outcome 
of an infection. The immune response against parasites consists of white blood cells that 
produce antibodies. These antibodies target the antigens (or proteins) present on the 
surface of the parasite or released into the host. Antibodies cost a lot of energy to produce 
and may damage the host’s own tissues. Fortunately for the parasite, the immune 
response does not have to kill it to be effective. It only has to reduce the feeding, 
movement and reproduction of the parasite to a tolerable level (Smith and Smith 1998). 
But the barrier posed by the immune response can be breached. Some parasites vary 
their antigens more or less continuously. By doing so, they are able to keep one step 
ahead of the host’s response. The result is a chronic infection of the parasites in the host. 
Eventually, it may wear out the immune system, allowing the infection to spread and 
become pathogenic.  
 
Balance between parasites and host 
In order to continue its existence, the parasite has to strike a balance with its host. The parasite 
gains no advantage if it kills its host, as a dead host means the end of its parasites. On the other 
hand, the host can’t afford to wear itself out in resisting the parasite. The host has to reach an 
optimum level of immune response, balancing beneficial and harmful consequences. It has to direct 
enough of its metabolic resources to minimize the cost of parasitism, without impairing its own 
growth and reproduction. The parasite has to achieve optimal growth and reproduction without 
overwhelming its host. Not to do so would be detrimental to both. In the course of evolution, host 
and parasite tend to develop a mutual tolerance (Smith and Smith 1998). 
 
Parasites are distinguished by size and may be classified as microparasites and 
macroparasites. Macroparasites include flatworms, roundworms, flukes, lice, fleas, ticks, 
and fungi. Macroparasites have a comparatively long generation time and direct 
reproduction in the host is rare. They can spread by direct transmission from host to host 
or by indirect transmission, involving intermediate hosts and carriers. Microparasites 
include viruses, bacteria and protozoa. They are characterized by small size and a short 
generation time. They develop and multiply rapidly within the host cells and tend to induce 
temporal of lifelong immunity to reinfection in hosts surviving the initial infections. The 
duration of the infection is short relative to the expected life span of the host. Transmission 
from host to host is direct although other species may serve as a carrier vector. They 
require a high host density to persist (Smith and Smith 1998).  
 
1.1.1 Virus diseases 
Most rapidly spreading epidemics are caused by microparasites, in particular airborne 
virus diseases. Viruses are more dependent on their hosts than macroparasites and 
bacteria. They are obligate intracellular parasites, meaning that they can only reproduce 
within a host cell. Isolated viruses are merely packaged sets of genes in transit from one 
host cell to another. Each type of virus can infect and parasitize only a limited range of 
host cells, called its host range. This host specificity depends on the evolution of 
recognition systems by the virus. Some viruses have host ranges broad enough to include 






A viral infection begins when the genome of a virus makes its way into the host cell. The 
mechanism by which this nucleic acid enters the cell varies. Once inside, the viral genome 
can command its host, reprogramming the cell to copy the viral nucleic acids and 
manufacture viral proteins. FMD virus and CSF virus are RNA viruses, meaning that they 
use the host’s RNA as a template for their own reproduction. The reproductive cycle of a 
RNA virus is given in figure 1.  
 
This cycle is approximately the same for FMD virus and CSF virus, except that the FMD 
virus is not enveloped. 
 
Thus, a virus diverts its host’s resources for viral production. The simplest type of viral 






Figure 1. The replication cycle of a single-stranded enveloped RNA virus. The proteins of the viral 
envelope recognize and bind to specific receptor molecules (not shown) on the surface of the host cell. The 
envelope fuses with the cell’s plasma membrane and the capsid and the viral genome enter the cell. The 
viral genome functions as a template for making complementary RNA strands, which have two functions: 
(1) they serve as template for making new copies of genome RNA and (2) they serve as mRNA. The 
mRNA is translated into both capsid proteins and proteins for the envelope. The cell’s endoplasmatic 
reticulum (ER) synthesizes the proteins for the envelope that are transported to the cell’s membrane by 
vesicles. A capsid assembles around each viral genome molecules and the virus buds from the cell.  
(After fig. 18-6, Campbell et al. 1999) 
Figure 2. The transmission of a virus from an infected animal to a susceptible animal
Transmission routes (arrows from infected animal) are different ways for a virus (balls) to get outside 
the body of an infected animal and be placed directly (or indirectly) in a position that enable a 
susceptible animal to possibly get infected. The infection routes (arrows to susceptible animal) are 





infected host cell, which is often destroyed in the process. In fact, some symptoms of viral 
infections result from cellular damage and death and/or from the body’s responses to this 
destruction. Cells may produce toxins after reprogramming, which can also cause 
symptoms. The viral progeny that leave a cell have the potential to infect additional cells, 
spreading the viral infection (Campbell et al. 1999). The amount of virus in the body of the 
host thus keeps building up and the virus may infect host cells that provide a way out, 
enabling the virus to be transmitted to other animals, for example epithelium cells. 
 
1.1.2 The spread of an infection 
Viruses find their way to another host via different transmission routes (figure 2). A 
transmission route is a way for a virus to get outside the body of an infected animal by 
excretions, secretions or dead body parts and be placed directly (or indirectly) in a position 
so that a susceptible animal could get infected. An infection route is a way for a 
susceptible animal to get infected with a virus when it is in the vicinity. The manner in 
which the virus gets into the body of a host needs not be the same way as the virus took in 
leaving its host. For example, a sneeze (transmission route) from someone who has a cold 
can release virus particles into the air and by eating (infection route) a sandwich on which 
virus containing droplets landed, a susceptible person can become infected.  
A disease is highly infectious when the virus replicates rapidly inside the host and is 
excreted in large amounts by a transmission route that can easily infect susceptible hosts. 
Transmission risk is density-dependent, meaning that in circumstances of high density, 
such as in stables and meadows, the probability that excreted viruses will find their way to 
another host is high.   
Pathogens can play an important role in the processes of the ecosystem. The pathogen 
may regulate the population of a host, by killing infected animals directly or by reducing the 
immune response so that secondary infections can take hold and kill infected animals. 
This reduces the population density to such a level, that transmission of the pathogen is 
minimal. It is also possible that the pathogen and host species are well adapted to each 
other. In these cases the host is persistently infected with the parasite, but is minimally 
affected by the pathogen. Such a host species may be a reservoir of infection for other 
species in the ecosystem. On the other side of the spectrum there are dead-end hosts. 
The animals of such a host species can become infected by the pathogen, but the animals 
are killed by the pathogen before the pathogen had time to reproduce and become 
transmitted to another animal. 
The basic reproduction rate (Ro) of a pathogen can be helpful in assessing to what extent 
factors can influence the epidemiology of a disease. An infection will turn to an epidemic 
when the basic reproduction rate is much greater than one (Ro>1), meaning that more 
animals are infected in the new ‘generation’ than in the previous ‘generation’. Thus, the 
number of infected animals increases constantly. The disease will prevail when the basic 
reproduction rate of the virus approximates one (Ro=1), meaning that the number of 
infected animals in the population remains constant. When the basic reproduction rate falls 
below one (Ro<1), the infection will die-out, because fewer animals are infected in the new 
‘generation’ than in the previous ‘generation’. This means that the number of infected 
animals decreases until there is no one left.  
 
1.2 Transmission of Animal Diseases 
The severity of an infectious disease commonly differs between species, but this 
difference is also dependant on the strain or serotypes involved in the infection. Strains 
sometimes show differences in preference for a particular transmission route. Virulence 
and infectivity also vary with the serotype of the pathogen. Strains causing only mild 
symptoms may pass unnoticed for some time, allowing the disease a wide proliferation, 





An endemic infection means that the pathogen can persist inside an area or population, 
without input from another infection source. This does not mean that every animal carries 
the pathogen all the time. The pathogen is transmitted from host to host like a baton in a 
relay race forever going round and round in a population or area with susceptible animal. 
Lowering the population density can stop this, because it diminishes the chance that 
infected animals meet susceptible animals. The disease will then eventually die out. An 
infection can also be self-limiting in host species, because after a while most animals are 
infected and either die or acquire immunity. After the immunity has worn off, reinfection 
can occur from an outside infection source. This infection source needs not be an endemic 
host. The relay race can be seen as an infection cycle from species to species as well as 
from infected animals to susceptible animals. 
It is important to keep in mind that pathogens may not take all the routes of transmission 
and not every host species is fit for every transmission route. The amount of pathogen that 
animals excrete depends on the route of transmission, the type or strain involved, the 
species that is infected and the stage of infection. The amount of pathogen needed to 
infect a susceptible animal depends on the animal species, the pathogen strain or type 
and the route of infection. The first distinction in transmission routes can be made on the 
way a pathogen can bridge the distance between old host and new host. With direct 
transmission the distance between infected and susceptible animal has to be small. With 
indirect transmission the distance it can be far greater.  
 
1.2.1 Direct transmission 
When an infected animal meets with susceptible animals, transmission commonly occurs 
through direct contact. Infected animals may carry the pathogen in various excretions and 
secretions (such as saliva, blood, faeces, milk) that can come into contact with susceptible 
animals. Coughing and sneezing is the most common way for a pathogen to get outside its 
host’s body. Contact with infected blood (from scabs and wounds) or milk sometimes 
infects susceptible animals.  
A second route of direct transmission is through sexual contact. The pathogen may be 
present in the semen of an infected male animal. Infected sperm may transmit the disease 
by natural or artificial insemination. Infected females may transmit the disease to males 
through sexual intercourse. This route seems unlikely for transmission between different 
species, but inter-species sexual contact occasionally happens.  
A third route of direct transmission is from infected mother to foetus. When a pregnant 
female animal gets infected it may infect her offspring if the pathogen can pass the 
placental barrier. In farm animals, transmission via infected embryos transferred to host 
mothers is also a route to be considered. Infected offspring may die in the womb or after 
birth due to the infection. Sometimes survivors are subclinically infected after birth, 
meaning that they excrete the pathogen without showing any symptoms of being infected. 
Also surviving young may be latently infected, meaning that they carry the pathogen with 
them without excreting it. Reactivation of the pathogen may take place in certain 
circumstances. These latter two types of infection even occur in adult animal.  
The last route of transmission is direct contact with dead animals. Infected animals that die 
from their infection may hold the pathogen in large amounts for a long time. Latently 
infected animals or carriers that die of other causes sometimes pose a transmission risk. 
Scavengers (such as pigs and crows) and carnivorous predators may eat the meat of a 
dead animal and become infected. Pigs also eat dead pigs. This is a common 
phenomenon and may cause an infection to persist within a pig population. The question 
is, how long the pathogen can survive inside the tissue of a dead animal. Only then can 
the risk of transmission from dead animals in nature reserves be assessed. The 
transmission of prions causing Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is suspected to 
occur through the feeding of animal by-products, such as meat and bone meal. BSE in 
cattle is suspected to originate from feeding of animal by-products of sheep infected with 





Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans at an uncommonly young age (for a review see 
Blanchfield 1998).  
   
1.2.2 Indirect transmission 
The routes of direct transmission occur more frequently, but the distance direct 
transmission is able to bridge is small. Indirect transmission routes may occur less 
frequent but have the potential of spreading over greater distances. This depends on 
modes of transport and the pathogen’s survival outside its host. There are two routes of 
indirect transmission that are distinctly different from each other in some ways and similar 
in others. The first is through abiotic vectors and the second is through biotic vectors. 
Biotic vectors are commonly identified as animals or humans, as there is little known about 
plants and other non-animals as possible vectors.  
 
Transmission via the abiotic environment 
Long distance transport of a pathogen by the environment is dependent on meteorological 
conditions. As these conditions vary in time, pathogens survive longer in seasons that 
provide the better conditions. Viruses survive best at low temperatures, because their life 
cycle turnover slows down and they become dormant. Unlike bacteria they don’t 
reproduce outside a living host. 
Respiratory excretion, faeces and urine from an infected population with a high density 
can cause aerosol formation. An aerosol is a cloud of suspended particles that can be 
transported over long distances by wind. These particles can be saliva or droplet nuclei 
containing the pathogen. Dispersal by this route depends on many factors. Wind speed, 
stability, pollutants, precipitation, humidity, temperature and sunlight are the most 
important factors favouring or disfavouring transport of active pathogens over long 
distances (Gloster et al. 1982). The concentration of pathogens commonly decreases with 
distance due to diffusion and inactivation. The amount of pathogens produced depends on 
the animal species as well as the density of the infected animals. In some diseases, one 
animal can excrete enough pathogens to form an aerosol capable of infecting another 
animal (commonly from another species) that is kilometres away. A few studies indicate 
that airborne transmission over sea is also possible over tens of kilometres. Pseudorabies 
was shown to spread apart by airborne transmission between islands in Denmark that 
were 30 to 40 kilometres apart (Christensen et al. 1993). 
Another route is the transmission via soil and surface water. Some pathogens can survive 
in soil and water for long periods of time when the environmental conditions are optimal. 
Introduction of the pathogen into the environment and subsequent survival and transport 
can occur through many routes. For example, infected faeces may enter the environment 
by droppings from infected wildlife, sewage from farms and by farmers fertilizing their land. 
Susceptible animals may come into contact with the infected soil by grazing or drinking 
infected water. The pathogen may also survive on tools, materials, machinery and cars.  
In order to prevent unnecessary killing of wild animals, it is important to have quantitative 
knowledge of transmission risks. For example, American bison straying from Yellowstone 
National Park are shot for fear of transmitting Brucellosis to cattle. Most likely interspecies 
transmission route is contact with contaminated birthing or abortion sites, but the actual 
risk however is probably very small, as birthing behaviour, predators and weathering 
‘clear’ the site of Brucella bacteria (Clarke 1998, Baskin 1998). 
 
Transmission via animal vectors 
Mechanical animal vectors are animals that are themselves unsusceptible to the pathogen 
but can transmit it to susceptible animals. For example pets, birds, rodents, insects, 
carnivores and humans. Some of these vectors may eat the meat of an infected animal 





Another route of transmission is blood. Ticks and mosquitoes may suck blood of an 
infected animal and transmit the pathogen when it feeds from an uninfected animal. The 
transmission of malaria via mosquitoes is a well-known example for humans.  
The last route of transmission is via clothing, hair, fur or feathers of an unsusceptible 
human or animal. This is similar to the abiotic vectors, the difference being, that animal 
vectors provide a microclimate that is more stable. This may prolong the survival of some 
pathogens.  
For animal vectors to work effectively, it is said that there should be enough vector animals 
exposed to high amounts of pathogens. They also must have a fair chance of close 
contact with susceptible animals. In addition, the pathogen must be able to survive the 
period between hosts (Gloster et al. 1982).  
 
1.2.3 Infection dose 
Infection risk is expressed in terms referring to MID (minimum infectious dose) or PFU 
(number of plaque forming units), depending on the method employed to determine 
infectivity. The MID can be converted to the probability that one infectious particle infects 
an animal. For example, a MID50 of 100 TCID50 would correspond to a chance of 0.0069 
that one individual virus particle infects one susceptible animal. This is relevant because 
theoretically, only one infectious virus particle is needed to infect an animal as long as the 
particle penetrates a susceptible cell. Looking again at the example, the chance that one 
animal becomes infected by one infectious particle is bigger when there are 200 
susceptible animals present instead of 10 susceptible animals (0.75 and 0.07 respectively, 
Sutmoller and Vose 1997). Notably, these probabilities will differ between species and 
between infection routes. 
Three different routes of infection can be distinguished. First, there is the respiratory route 
where the infectious particles are inhaled and commonly infect respiratory tissue 
(particularly the pharynx), from which it can spread through the entire body. Second, the 
oral route, by which an ingested pathogen enters the body through absorption in the 
intestines. Last, the venal route where the pathogen enters the body, through scabs and 
wounds in the skin, by vectors like mosquitoes or ticks, or through blood-blood contact 
(from mother to foetus, sexual contact).  
The time it takes a susceptible animal to contract an infection via the first two routes, 
depends on the amount of particles in the air or food, as well as the amount of particles an 
animal can inhale (respiratory route) or consume (oral route). A short period of exposure to 
a lot of pathogens seems to be more infectious than a long period of exposure to a low 
concentration of pathogens (Alexandersen and Donaldson 2002).  
 
1.2.4 Carrier state 
After exposure to a pathogen, an animal can develop a subclinical infection, meaning that 
it excretes the pathogen without showing any symptoms of being infected. This is referred 
to as carrier state. A carrier state can also result after recovery from a clinical infection, 
meaning that the pathogen persists in certain areas of the body. Pathogen excretion may 
still occur, but this will be at lower level and there will be no visible symptoms. Trigger 
factors, like stress, may increase the excretion level. In certain conditions, vaccination may 
induce a carrier state. This is possible when the vaccine reduces the clinical signs of the 
disease by leaves the infection intact, allowing continued transmission of the pathogen.  
 
1.3 Evaluation of transmission risks 
With sufficient data, it is possible to quantify transmission risk for each possible route. 
Given the state of available data, in particular with regard to wildlife, a tentative risk 
evaluation is the best we can manage. It involves mapping all transmission routes 
between livestock and wildlife and assessing in which direction the transmission is most 





populations to become a reservoir of pathogens for future outbreaks is also important, 
because persistently infected populations can act as reservoir. There are different factors 
of concern for such an assessment, such as animal density, habitat type, species 
behavioural differences and human influence. 
• Population density is important for the transmission within a herd, because it is 
correlated with the chance that an infected animal and a susceptible animal meet. 
It is also important for the transmission between herds, because aerosols 
commonly form when there is more than one infected animals. 
• Farm animals are kept in a broad array of settings: from animals living in stables 
isolated from the outside world (by absolute air filtration) to animals extensively 
kept in meadows or woodland where they have free contact with wild animals. 
Similarly, wildlife and semi-wild populations live in a variety of densities and habitat 
types. The diversity can range from enclosed area, isolated from other wild 
populations and domestic animals, to habitats allowing free access to farm animals 
and other wildlife populations.  
• The behaviour of sick animals and the behaviour of susceptible animals when 
confronted with a dead or dying animal may be significantly effect the risk of 
(direct) transmission. Other things like foraging behaviour (solitary or in herds) and 
behaviour towards animal vectors could also influence the actual risk of 
transmission. Behaviours can thus facilitate or diminish the chance of infection 
apart from excretion and infection doses. Differences in behaviour can occur 
between species. 
• Humans also influence the transmission, either as involuntarily vectors of 
transmission, or by implementing preventive or control measures. The 
effectiveness of the different measures that are taken is very important. Preventive 
measures that can be taken are vaccination, fencing and hunting. Control 
measures that can be taken during an outbreak, may be stamping out, hunting and 












2 Disease Control and Nature  
In this chapter, a number of prevention and control strategies are reviewed and discussed 
with respect to their impact on nature conservation goals. The EU aims at a non-
vaccinated disease-free status for a number of important animal diseases. These are 
generally highly communicable diseases, capable of massive transboundary epidemics 
and considerable economic losses. The disease-free status without vaccination gives the 
best guarantee, that exported animals or animal products are truly pathogen-free. This 
status also warrants maximum market access to other member states and WTO partners 
beyond the EU. WTO member states are allowed to impose trade restrictions for 
veterinary reasons, like preserving their own disease-free status. The price of a non-
vaccinated disease-free status is the ‘stamping out’ control strategy. Should an outbreak 
occur, all infected animals as well as potentially infected animals near an outbreak site are 
to be killed and destroyed. 
In addition to measures to ensure good health of farm animals, like veterinary controls, 
farm hygiene, identification, registration and certification, there are a number of measures, 
specifically targeted to minimize veterinary risks from and to wild populations. 
 
2.1 Preventive measures 
Prevention involves a host of regulations, aimed at preventing infected animals or 
materials from entering the disease-free region. It involves restriction of contacts between 
animals from different farms and between farm animals and veterinary hygiene at the farm 
as well as in the food chain. Identification, registration, health certificates and quarantine 
rules serve to minimize infection risks during transport and to allow backtracking to the 
source of occasional outbreaks. Early identification of a listed disease is critical, as well as 
strict protocols in case of suspicious or proven outbreaks. Below, some measures with 
particular impact on wildlife are discussed. 
 
2.1.1 Surveillance and reporting 
In order to maintain a disease-free status, adequate surveillance and reporting systems 
are of the essence, in order to minimize reaction time (the time between infection and 
suspicion by the authorities). Given the consequences of control measures in case of an 
outbreak, farmers may be tempted to cover up first infections or to postpone reporting. 
Compliance with veterinary hygiene rules at the farm and during transport are also of the 
essence. An adequate surveillance system includes control and enforcement of these 
measures. This is most important for the protection of wildlife too, as outbreaks in a 
disease-free zone generally occur among livestock. 
 
2.1.2 Monitoring program  
An important measure to prevent outbreaks is monitoring wildlife, especially for diseases, 
including emerging diseases where wild populations can be a source. The quicker the 
disease is diagnosed in a nature reserve, the quicker control measures can be taken to 
halt transmission. In addition, keeping track of other variables during and before an 
outbreak (like herd size, age structure or movement) may give insight in factors that 
influence the occurrence or course of an epidemic. This may lead to better control policies 
in the future. Monitoring involves regular observation of live animal populations and the 
investigation of dead animals that have been found or shot by hunters (Mörner et al., 
2002). Ecological processes seem unlikely to be influenced by monitoring. 
Although EU directive 92/45/CEE recommends a country scale reporting system to assess 
the health of game species, only a few countries in Europe have their own wildlife disease 
‘surveillance’ network (Artois et al. 2001). Monitoring of wild and semi-wild herbivores has 
among other places been implemented in the nature reserve Oostvaardersplassen, in the 





or are shot by gamekeepers (pers. comm. J.A.P. Heesterbeek). Officially recognized 
institutional networks for reporting mortality and diseases in wild species are nonetheless 
rare in the EU. For Europe, an informal network based on the members of the European 
section of the Wildlife Disease Association (EDWA) provides data from 16 country reports. 
From the available data, Artois concludes that there is an increasing interest in wildlife 
disease surveillance in Europe (Artois et al. 2001). 
 
2.1.3 Prevention of direct contact 
Where domestic animals roam outside, direct contact between wild and domestic animals 
is possible. Fencing can help to separate domestic and (semi-) wild populations. Such a 
fence can be placed to isolate a wild population from the surrounding domestic farms or it 
can be placed around farms to isolate them from the surrounding wildlife, depending on 
the situation. Contact through the fence is still not prevented, therefore double electrified 
fencing is recommended. In Zimbabwe, three large game reserves are isolated by double-
electrified fencing for the control of FMD. The fences function as a barrier between 
infected zones (with African buffalo) and FMD-free zones with domestic animals 
(Sutmoller et al. 2000). This proved not as effective as expected because antelopes were 
found to jump over the fence. Costs of fencing, capable of keeping wildlife out, are an 
order of magnitude higher than the costs of regular fences, designed to confine domestic 
animals to their meadows. (author’s remark). 
Another disadvantage of fencing is that migration routes of wild animals may be blocked, 
causing ecological disturbance (Thomas et al. 2003). In the Kalahari Desert, fences 
caused hundreds of thousands of wildebeest to die during drought, because they were 
isolated from water sources. Examples of Eurasian species that migrate over long 
distances are Mongolian gazelle, Saiga antelope, and Reindeer. Mongolian gazelles 
regularly cross country borders. The border fences do not block migration, but a large 
number of animals are often severely wounded by barbed wire, leading to high mortalities 
in populations already weakened from harsh climatic circumstances (Cromsigt 2003).  
 
2.1.4 Movement restriction 
Movement of wild animals within and between nature reserves may occur, through 
deliberate introduction of animals or through spontaneous migration, enabled by the 
establishment of large, interconnected reserves (ecological network). This contributes to 
the risk of long distance transmission of diseases. The first type of movement can be 
regulated but the autonomous movement of animals is harder to control, especially when 
they do not live in an enclosed area. Fragmentation of habitats is undesirable, and the 
ecological network is an integral part of the EU nature conservation policy. But during 
epidemics the connections may have to be blocked to prevent transmission. It would be 
most achievable by using natural barriers and by blocking corridors in the ecological 
network. This way, movement restriction may have a minor impact on the ecological 
processes, especially when it occurs outside the migratory season as a temporary 
measure. 
 
2.1.5 Preventive vaccination 
By vaccinating the population, immunization reduces the number of susceptible animals. 
The choice of a non-vaccinated disease-free status precludes general vaccination 
programmes of farm animals. Vaccination of wildlife should be an option, as wild animals 
commonly do not take part in trade, but OIE only allows it for endangered species 
individually tagged and strictly confined to zoos or pens. Vaccination does not harm the 
host, which might be preferable for nature conservation agencies. Yet it disturbs natural 
ecological processes, as the role of the disease has been ruled out (e.g. regulating the 
population densities). Intervention in the host-parasite interaction is a disruption of the 





with competitors, parasites, infections and with the rigours of environment and are as they 
are entirely because of this’ (Kirkwood and Sainsbury 1996). 
Vaccination of wildlife is not always feasible. They roam free in a large area and for 
intravenal vaccination they have to be caught or rounded up. This is neither advisable 
(because of stress to the animals) nor practical. Oral administration in the form of baits 
seems partly effective in wild boar (Kaden et al. 2000). 
A problem with vaccinating is that the distinction between vaccinated animals and infected 
animals cannot always be made (Van Campen et al. 2001). Vaccination may therefore 
preclude monitoring. In addition, vaccination may give rise to carriers. These objections 
don’t mean that vaccination is out of the question, but it should be applied with the 
necessary caution. 
 
2.1.6 Preventive depopulation by hunting  
Pre-emptive culling is meant to keep the population of susceptible animals at a low 
density. Meaning that the population is maintained at the threshold density at which an 
outbreak would be self-limiting. The frequency of contact between animals is diminished 
and the total number of susceptible animals decreased.  
Nature organizations don’t favour this option, because the density is often decreased far 
below the optimum population size. In addition, the culling of herbivore species is at odds 
with the main goal of nature conservation, preventing them from playing their part in the 
ecosystem.  
In addition, keeping population density artificially low by hunting has often yielded 
unsatisfactory results, because of compensatory reproduction and immigration. As hunting 
alone cannot keep density levels as low as desired, additional measures like contraception 
should be considered (Artois et al. 2001). No research has so far been done on the 
feasibility of such a combined method. It may be possible to orally administer 
contraception to wild boars in the same way as done by Kaden and others (2000). 
Contraception would disturb the social order and mating cycle of wild boars (pers. comm. 
M. Montizaan). All attempts to maintain a population at a desired density with artificial 
means are a form of stewardship representing a great disruption in the ecological 
processes. 
 
2.2 Control measures 
Control strategies involve the closing off of all possible transmission routes as early and as 
complete as possible, as well as eradication the infection source, either by destroying the 
pathogen through vaccination or by killing and subsequent destruction of infected animals. 
It involves rapid identification of the primary infection source, as well as all secondary 
sources and susceptible animals that could have had contact with an infection source. 
Within a zone surrounding an outbreak source, very strict quarantine and eradication 
programmes enter into force. Maximum transmission rate, the minimum reaction time (i.e. 
time between infection and recognition) and incubation time determine how large the 
zones have to be. Below, some control measures and their impact on wildlife are 
discussed. 
 
2.2.1 Isolation and movement restriction  
In case of an outbreak, domestic animals are usually stabled or confined to a pen, in order 
to prevent contact with other animals. To close off transmission routes to or from wild 
populations during an outbreak, it is desirable to restrict movement of wild animals as well. 
The feasibility of this measure will among other things depend on the species (is it 
possible to confine them to a specific area?), as well as the size and landscape 






2.2.2 Stamping out 
Stamping out is the mass destruction of all infected animals and animals that were 
potentially exposed to them. The number of animals eventually killed and destroyed 
maybe small under favourable circumstances, such as early detection, low incubation 
time, prompt and adequate implementation of outbreak scenarios, low density of 
susceptible animals and weather conditions that limit survival and transmission rate of 
pathogens. Sabotage or sloppiness in carrying out control measures in high density 
regions, or plain bad luck, like for instance a not too virulent strain where infected animals 
don’t show too many symptoms, may cause a massive outbreak and the killing and 
destruction of millions of animals. It might even lead to the killing of all susceptible animals 
in a nature reserve. This would, of course, cause a lot of protest from authorities in charge 
of nature conservations, nature conservation and animal rights NGOs, as well as the 
public in general. For nature reserve managers, it would mean that their efforts and 
resources have gone to waste. Even protected species run the risk of being exterminated. 
Stamping out obviously is the worst-case scenario of any nature reserve manager. 
 
2.2.3 Depopulation by hunting 
Reducing the population to very low densities can also be employed as a control measure 
during an outbreak. Animals are shot until a threshold density is reached at which the 
infection fades out by itself. The difference with stamping out is that not all infected and in-
contact animals have to be killed. The same arguments that are mentioned against 
stamping out also stand for depopulation, with the addition that depopulation by hunting 
may not be as effective in wildlife situations as expected. Hunting may cause an infected 
herd to disperse out of their home range, thereby increasing the risk of transmission to 
neighbouring groups (Damhuis et al. 2004). Driving prey with dog and noise to a specific 
place is discouraged in most parts of Europe, because this causes the great disturbances. 
It is recommended for hunters to stake out at a place that is preferable for animals, such 
as feeding places.  
For wild boars, it is prohibited to shoot guiding sows or sows with piglets, because the 
social group falls apart and the remaining members disperse in multiple directions over 
large distances (more than 50km, Damhuis et al. 2004). Young boars and solitary sows 
without piglets should be targeted. Young boars are the main virus carriers (Kaden et al. 
2000). Shooting the sows without piglets may restrict new progeny. It is unclear if this also 
applies to other ungulates, as other species do not seem to be as intensely studied on this 
point. It is however plausible that other wild species also move away from areas where 
they are disturbed.  
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of hunting is that hunting might remove recovered 
immune individuals and favour compensatory reproduction and immigration. This may 
increase the proportion of non-exposed and therefore susceptible individuals. Additionally, 
if depopulation does not achieve the threshold density, the infection can remain endemic 
even at low incidence rates (Artois et al. 2001). Hunting may be allowed only after the 
epidemic peak has been reached in order to have a synergistic effect with the possible 
disease-induced reduction of population density and with the establishment of herd 
immunity (Laddomada 2000). At the beginning of the epidemic, hunting might be useful if 
carried out in the surroundings of the infected area as buffer zone, provided that the 
animals are not promoted to move outside the area itself. 
 
2.2.4 Emergency vaccination  
Emergency vaccination is often used to create a buffer zone around an epizootic to 
decrease the number of susceptible animals (‘ring vaccination’). This can halt further 
transmission. In non-vaccination disease-free zones, these animals are often killed later, 
because of the risk of persistence (unnoticed carrier state in vaccinated animals) (Moennig 





worthwhile to achieve protection of the wild animals and diminish their suffering. For 
endangered species or otherwise valuable stock, it may be the only option to save them. 
Emergency vaccination however poses the same constraints to the ecological processes 
as preventive vaccination. 
 
2.2.5 No intervention  
An important question is, whether a wildlife disease should be managed at all. Disease is 
a natural component of ecological systems, and having it run its course may in the long 
run more beneficial for population health than human intervention. Control measures may 
not always yield predictable results and wildlife disease managers should attempt to 
compare the real or 
expected patterns of 
infection in the presence 
and absence of control 
(Artois et al. 2001). 
Wilderness is characterized 
as uncontrolled by humans 
and for the most part free 
of human influence. The 
main process in an 
ecosystem is natural 
selection. ‘Survival of the 
fittest’ is the rule that keeps 
a natural ecosystem 
healthy. Wild animals 
therefore need to fend for 
themselves, without care or 
disturbance from humans. 
This care may help the 
least fit animals, decrease 
the adaptation of the 
species to the disease and 
help to promote one 
species on the cost of other 
species.  
The risk of non-intervention 
might be that the pathogen 
will persist in the wild 
population. The prevalence 
of the disease in wild 
populations that live near 
areas with livestock may 
pose a risk for future 
outbreaks in domestic 
animals. This has 
happened with bovine 
tuberculosis, which was 
introduced with cattle and 
has become endemic in 
many wild species, for 
example African buffalo 
populations, possums and 
ferrets in New Zealand, 
badgers in the UK and Ireland, bison in Canada and several deer species elsewhere in the 
Ethical issues and wildlife 
A popular view among conservationists is that humans are not 
responsible for the welfare of wild animals as long as suffering 
is unrelated to human activities (Kirkwood and Sainsbury 
1996). Disease prevention measures may be important for the 
conservation of populations when endangered by man 
(Kirkwood and Sainsbury 1996). However, ‘to intervene, to 
prevent or treat an infectious disease in a wild animal, is to 
arbitrarily take sides in what is likely to have been a 
host/parasite relationship that has evolved over a profoundly 
long time’ (Kirkwood and Sainsbury 1996). ‘Additionally, 
disease is important for the maintenance of biodiversity 
because it influences the species complement within 
established ecosystems’ (Cunningham 1996). Human 
intervention may not be beneficial for the ecological whole. 
Intervention might impair population fitness by promoting the 
survival of the least fit animals in the population. Disease 
control in wildlife on the base of economical reasons will conflict 
with ‘our moral duty to ensure that ecosystems do not lose 
vitality and that evolutionary processes promoting biodiversity 
in the long term continue with as little disturbance as possible’ 
(Klaver et al. 2002).  
There is however a dilemma when it comes to exotic diseases 
that are new to the ecosystem. Is human intervention 
permissible when it is to eradicate an exotic disease that has 
been introduced by humans and has a devastating effect on 
the original ecosystem? In other words, do humans have a 
responsibility to protect the current ecosystem or do humans 
have to allow the ecosystem to adapt to the new element (i.e. 
disease) through the process of natural selection? 
Another problem is that semi-wild animals are neither wild nor 
domestic and there is an ongoing discussion about the extent 
of human responsibility for the welfare of these animals. Semi-
wild animals have always been influenced by human activities 
and the process of de-domestication is actually the transition 
from individual care to a focus on animal populations and the 
role of the animal in the ecosystem. This transition is however 
not a distinct line. It is hard to assess when individual suffering 
(by a pathogen) is unavoidable, because the semi-wild 
population is adapting to fend for itself with natural selection 
taking its toll or when individual suffering justifies care for the 
welfare of animals that are under human stewardship. It is 
therefore necessary to further investigate the ethical aspects of 





world. For some diseases, for example rabies and anthrax, there may be compelling 
reasons for intervention. (Bengis et al, 2002). In general, when it concerns highly 
infectious diseases, intervention in wildlife enters the picture. Yet, non-intervention is still 





3 Foot and Mouth Disease 
 
Some of the biggest conflicts between agricultural and nature organizations arise in the 
control of foot and mouth disease (FMD). It is a highly communicable disease, affecting 
sheep, pigs, cattle and goats. Severe loss in body weight and a significant decreased milk 
production of infected animals can bring about economic disaster. These aspects call for 
severe control measures, although most adult animals survive the disease. Between 1962 
and the late ‘80s, FMD was eradicated by annual vaccination of cattle in most European 
countries. No other susceptible species were preventively vaccinated. By the end of the 
80s, there were no longer any endemic strains of FMD virus in the EU and its adjacent 
countries. Therefore, vaccination was abolished in the EU as well as its bordering 
countries. Since 1991, the EU maintains a non-vaccinated disease-free status for FMD.  
In spite of the buffer zone in the Thrace region, Turkey appears to be a permanent source 
of sporadic outbreaks in the Balkans and thus a potential threat to the rest of Europe 
Russia was not able to maintain the buffer zones in the Caucasian region and the Central 
Asian States. FMD still persists in the Caucasian region, but the risk of spreading to 
Russia and Europe is considered limited (Leforban and Berbier 2002). 
As demonstrated in recent years, the major risk for Europe is associated with animals and 
meat imported or smuggled from Asia or the Middle East and possibly Africa, but not from 
South America (Leforban and Berbier 2002). Lack of control measures during trade is the 
main cause that FMD can persist in all these areas. In South East Asia for example, the 
market-driven transboundary movement of livestock is unregulated and vaccination is not 
used widely as a control tool because of the expense (Gleeson 2002, Perry et al. 2002). 
Transhumance, the seasonal movement of people and their livestock to regions of 
different climate, is also an uncontrolled transboundary movement (Macpherson 1995). 
During the 2001 outbreak, which was mainly located in Great Britain and the Netherlands, 
hundreds of thousands of domestic animals were killed and behind the scenes scenarios 
were already discussed to exterminate all susceptible animals, should a FMD outbreak be 
observed near a nature reserve. Fortunately, this situation did not arise, but in the same 
period in Mongolia an outbreak of FMD was (incorrectly) attributed to the Mongolian 
gazelle (Procapra gutturosa). Plans were ready to exterminate a large proportion of the 
gazelle population. Only enormous pressure from different international organizations 
prevented this from actually happening (Cromsigt 2001). Nature conservationists maintain 
that preventive vaccination of livestock is a sound and more nature-friendly alternative, 
albeit at the cost of the coveted disease-free status (Cromsigt 2001). Recently a new 
directive has been adopted that allows emergency vaccination under certain 
circumstances. This may have consequences for a country’s trade position, which is why 
countries are reluctant to apply it (pers. comm. E.G.M. van Klink).  
 
3.1 FMD, the disease 
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is caused by viruses of the genus Apthovirus. Seven 
distinct serotypes, with indistinguishable clinical effects have been defined, namely types 
O, A, C, Southern African Territories (SAT) 1, SAT 2, SAT 3 and Asia 1. Recovery from 
infection with one serotype will protect from infection with the same serotype, but not from 
subsequent infection with another serotype. ‘FMD virus has a wide host range, an ability to 
infect in small doses, a rapid replication, a high level of viral excretion and multiple modes 
of transmission’ (Alexandersen et al. 2003). This RNA virus can infect most hoofed 
animals. The pathogenesis of the virus differs between host species and between virus 
strains. Common symptoms are lesions in the mouth and hooves. All even-hoofed 
ungulates are susceptible to FMD. 
FMD can cause severe and potentially fatal disease in cattle (Bos taurus), pigs (Sus 





symptoms are anorexia, shedding of hooves and unwillingness to move or possible 
lameness. Secondary bacterial infection of foot lesions sometimes cripples animals. In 
pigs the main symptom is acute lameness (Geller 2001). The mortality rate for mature 
animals seldom exceeds five percent, but young animals may suffer mortality rates as high 
as 50 percent (Meyer and Knudsen 2001) or higher. Mortalities of 64% in lambs and 55% 
in kids have been reported (Sharma 1981).  
The disease is more severe in mountain gazelles (Gazella gazella), impala (Aepyceros 
melampus), roe and muntjac deer, with consequently higher mortality rates (Gibbs et al. 
1975, Thomson et al. 2003). A more benign course with mild and subclinical symptoms 
seems to occur more often in sheep (Ovis aries), fallow deer (Dama dama), red deer 
(Cervus elaphus), African buffalo (Syncerus caffer) and goats (Capra hircus, Sharma et al. 
1981, Gibbs et al. 1974, Thomson et al. 1992).  
The development of atypical symptoms also depends on the virus strain involved 
(Sakamoto and Yoshida 2002). According to Haigh and others (2002) couldn’t find any 
reports of FMD in European bison (Bison bonasus). Yet there have been FMD outbreaks 
among bison populations in Poland in 1946, 1951 and 1952, although during these 
outbreaks only few bison died (pers. comm. J. Kita). Symptoms in bison were similar to 
cows (pers. comm. J. Kita).  
Goats, camels (Camelus bactrianus) and water buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) are frequently 
mentioned as susceptible hosts, but research data on the epidemiology of FMD in these 
species are very limited (Samara and Pinto 1983, Gomes et al. 1997, Barnett and Cox 
1999, Kitching and Hughes 2002). Notably, camels showed clinical signs during the 
epidemic in Mongolia (Sakamoto and Yoshida 2002) and they are frequently vaccinated in 
Egypt (Aidaros 2002). No antibodies where found in camels after an epidemic in Kenya, 
whereas eland (Taurotragus oryx) did (Paling et al. 1979). Other species that can contract 
FMD are llama, blackbuck, sambar, nilgai, Tibetan black bear, yak and spotted deer (Kar 
et al. 1983, Musser 2004), but research data is also lacking. 
There is no data on the origin of FMD. In 1545, it was first described in cattle in Italy. The 
disease was common in France, Germany and Italy in the 17th and 18th century. It did not 
spread to Britain until 1839. The early history of FMD in Asia and Africa is not known 
(Thomson et al. 2001). Nowadays, the disease is endemic in large parts of Africa, Asia 
and South America (Alexandersen et al. 2003). However, the only species known to be a 
maintenance host is the African buffalo, which means that FMD persists in some 
populations of buffalo without input from external infection sources. The SAT types are 
unique to Africa and have an intimate and probably ancient association with African 
buffalo. African buffalo are the usual source of SAT-type infections for domestic livestock 
and wild ungulates in southern Africa (Bastos et al. 2000). Persistently infected African 
buffaloes in the wild constantly generate variants of SAT 1 and SAT 2, causing the 
immune response to always be one step behind (Vosloo et al.1996). This complicates the 
eradication of the disease through immunization. Until now no major outbreak with SAT 
types have occurred in Eurasia, although sporadically infections in the Middle East have 
occurred (Aidaros 2002, Leforban and Gerbier 2002). This study mainly focuses on the 
situation in Eurasia, so the situation with endemic FMD in African buffalo is not discussed 
here. 
 
3.2 Primary outbreaks 
Primary outbreaks are probably inevitable (Leforban, 2002). Before the 50s FMD used to 
ravage Europe at intervals of 5-10 years. Between large epidemics, the disease continued 
to occur, sporadically or endemically, in regions with high animal densities or movements. 
From 1951, vaccination was widely applied, which led to a gradual decline of the disease. 
New outbreaks tended to occur from the Near East, with Turkey the most vulnerable 
region. In Asian Turkey, Anatolia, FMD is still endemic. Preventive vaccination of cattle 
only proved sufficient to eradicate the disease from the European continent. From the ban 





type O strains, endemic in Asia. Most of these outbreaks were traced to illegal trade or 
transports of infected animals and products. Illegal immigration also counted for some 
outbreaks. Where the primary source was unknown, there was strong suspicion of illegal 
activities. One outbreak in Russia was due to an escaped laboratory virus, type A. The 
2001 outbreak in the UK originated on a pig farm and has been attributed to illegal swill 
feeding. It was spread to the continent by the trade of sheep without apparent symptoms, 
before the FMD outbreak in the UK came to light (Leforban and Gerben, 2002). In primary 
outbreaks in the EU, illegal activities always lie at the root, as regular trade in animals and 
animal products, even from countries without the FMD-free status does not constitute a 
risk (Sutmoller and Casas Olascoaga, 2003. Leforban and Gerben, 2002). 
 
3.3 Direct transmission routes 
When infected and susceptible animals are in close proximity, the aerial transfer of 
droplets and droplet nuclei is probably the most common mode of transmission over short 
distances (Alexandersen et al. 2003). Direct contact between and within different animal 
species have frequently been reported to cause FMD infections. For example, 
transmission has occurred between deer, sheep and cattle (Gibbs et al. 1975, Gibbs et al. 
1975b), between cattle, water buffalo and goats (Dutta et al. 1983) and between sheep 
and pigs (Amass et al. 2003).  
Bouma et al (2004) found that direct transmission from one separately held calf to two 
other separately held calves could not be demonstrated with a type O virus strain. But in a 
recent experiment by Karin Orsel and others, FMD transmission did occur between calves 
housed together in a group. In this case, vaccination was able to significantly decrease 
transmission (pers. comm. K. Orsel).  
Contact transmission also occurs through physical contact with infected excretions or 
secretions, including vesicular fluid or vesicular epithelium containing relatively large 
amounts of FMD virus. Donaldson et al (1982) found samples of FMD positive milk 
containing a maximum of 106.7 TCID50 /ml and blood samples with a maximum of 106.7 
TCID50 /ml, both from cows. Gibbs et al (1975) found in deer that the amount of virus in 
the blood samples and in the samples of the respiratory tract were similar to those 
recorded for sheep and cattle in the same experiment during the course of the infection 
(table 1).  
 
Table 1. Excretion doses of different species via respiration, blood and faeces for FMD. 






















106.1 e  
107.0 b 
 
102.9 f, g 
 
Goats n.d.* n.d. 102.5 h 
Roe deer 104.0 a 106.0 b n.d. 
Red deer 104.0 a 105.0 b n.d. 
Fallow deer 103.7 a 105.0 b n.d. 
Sika deer 104.0 a 106.0 b n.d. 
Muntjac deer 104.0 a 107.0 b n.d. 
Camel n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Water buffalo n.d. n.d. n.d. 
European bison n.d. n.d. n.d. 
* No data      e TCID50 /pig/24h (Donaldson et al. 2001) 
a TCID50 /animal/30min (Gibbs et al. 1975)   f  ID50 /gr (Sellers and Parker 1969) 
b TCID50 /ml (Gibbs et al. 1975)    g ID50 /gr (Parker 1971) 
c TCID50 /pig/hour (Alexandersen and Donaldson 2002) h TCID50/gm (Sharma 1981)  






The amount of virus from vesicles was usually in excess of 108.0 TCID50 /g tissue for 
each of fallow, red and roe deer (Forman and Gibbs 1974). 
FMD virus has also been found in the faeces of infected animals, but the infectivity of 
excreted virus may decrease rapidly due to inactivation. The inactivation rate of FMD virus 
varies with the pH, temperature and ambient humidity. For pigs there is a consistently low 
level of virus in faeces (Parker 1971) and cattle seem to excrete substantially higher 
amounts of virus than sheep and pigs (Sellers and Parker 1969). Unfortunately, there is no 
data for the virus content in faeces of other herbivore species.  
 
Sexual contact and mother-foetus 
Transmission via sexual contact and from mother to foetus is an under-researched topic. 
There are just a few indications that these routes are indeed possible in cattle. For 
example, FMD virus is easily transmitted by the semen of bulls (Wentink et al. 2000). And 
there is a high probability that FMD infected cattle can yield high percentage of 
contaminated ova and embryos (Sutmoller and Wrathall 1997). This route is improbable in 
well-vaccinated cattle and carriers. In the experiment, washing the embryos was sufficient 
to remove the virus, meaning that the embryos themselves were never infected. A foetus 
may become infected with FMD in a later stage of gestation or when it comes into contact 
with contaminated maternal material (during or after birth). There is no transplacental 
transmission.  
FMD virus has been found in the uterine lumen and oviduct of cows during the clinical 
stage of the disease (Sutmoller and Wrathall 1997). So bulls might get infected during 
sexual contact. The relevance for these transmission routes, however, is questionable. As 
mentioned earlier, this disease is highly contagious in direct contact and the contribution of 




Post-mortal chemical changes reduce 
FMD infectivity. The acidity produced in 
carcass meat during rigor mortis in cattle 
will inactivate FMD virus. Cottral et al. 
(1960) measured the pH and interior 
temperature changes in muscles of steer 
carcasses during ripening at 4 ºC (figure 
3). FMD virus can survive in the pH range 
6 to 9. The superficial curve indicates the 
highest pH readings obtained in the 
superficial areas of the muscles and the 
deep curve represents the lowest 
readings from the deeper areas. The 
median curve represents the midpoint of 
observed pH values and is not the 
arithmetical mean. It appears that the 
threshold value where FMD virus 
becomes unstable is approximately 
reached after 3 to 48 hours. This means 
that the muscles tissue of dead cattle is 
probably free of active virus within 3 days 
at a temperature of 4 ºC. At higher 
temperatures this period of active virus in 
Figure 3. The pH and interior temperature changes in 
muscles of steer carcasses during maturation at 4 ºC. 
The superficial curve indicates the highest pH readings 
obtained in the superficial areas of the muscles and the 
deep curve represents the lowest readings from the deeper 
areas. The median curve represents the midpoint of 
observed pH values and is not the arithmetical mean. The 
temperature was measured 13 centimeters inside the 





dead bodies will be shorter as inactivation rate increases with temperature. Acidity of 
muscle tissue after rigor mortis in pigs seems to be variable, but has not been examined in 
detail for mutton (Alexandersen et al. 2003).  
This doesn’t imply that carcasses older than 3 days pose no risk factor at all, for the pH in 
bone marrow, lymph nodes and certain organs and offal does not decline (Donaldson 
1987). Infective virus therefore can be found in these materials for an extended period of 
time. In carcasses that were stored at 4 ºC, active virus was found in rib bone marrow after 
73 days and in lymph nodes and blood after 60 days (Cottral et al. 1960). Susceptible 
animals may ingest these parts of an infected carcass and subsequently become infected. 
However, a quantitative assessment of the virus was not executed (Cottral et al. 1960). 
Sharma (1981) reports that all tissues and organs of sheep and goats contain high 
quantities of FMD virus and could be potential disseminators of virus. Without a detailed 
course assessment after death, the risk of infection in time cannot be quantified. 
Not only ingestion, but merely direct contact with dead bodies may induce an infection, 
through inhalation of the virus by sniffing the exterior of the body. Gailiunas and Cottral 
(1967) found that FMD virus remained infectious on the hide of steers that were killed after 
the development of clinical signs, for up to 90 days at 15 ºC and for 352 days at 4 ºC. In 
this study, the infectivity was demonstrated by inoculation, so it is unclear whether under 
natural conditions (i.e. sniffing the carcass) a susceptible animal could also get infected. 
Dehydration of the carcass may also reduce the survival duration. 
Animal products from infected animals constitute an infection risk, especially when not 
cured at a pH lower than 6. Such animal products are, by definition illegal, as OIE 
prescribes slaughterhouses to subject carcasses to a maturation period of 24 hours at pH 
6 and deboning carcasses from vaccinated disease-free regions. Products from zones, 
where an outbreak has occurred need extensive treatment in order to destroy the virus 
(OIE, 2004). Products from vaccinated animals or from carrier animals do not constitute a 
significant risk, because the antigens keep the infectivity low (Sutmoller and Casas 
Olascoaga, 2003). 
 
3.4 Indirect transmission 
A lot of policy measures are taken to prevent direct contact between domestic populations 
and between wild and domestic populations to diminish the spread in case of an outbreak. 
But with FMD, indirect transmission is also an important possible route. This is much 
harder to control than direct contact between animals. 
 
3.4.1 Transmission via the abiotic environment 
Conditions conducive to survival of FMD virus are high humidity, low temperatures and 
neutral pH. Pollutants and sunlight were not found to be of influence (Donaldson and 
Ferris 1975). For stable aerosols the temperature needs to be below 33 ºC (Gloster 2004). 
The actual value of the relative humidity depends on the virus strain involved (Donaldson 
1972). The lowest value reported is 55% for a type A strain, but at a relative humidity 
above 70% each virus strain is certainly stable. Airborne virus is generally inactivated 
within a few hours when relative humidity falls below 55-70% (Donaldson 1972, Gloster et 
al. 1982). Mead (1979) however says that FMD virus is able to remain viable for long 
periods when dried on material around the farm; unfortunately no data was given on which 
he grounded this position. Drying will inactivate most but not all virus. The drying of fluids 
or organic material containing virus will also inactivate a relatively large proportion, but 
surviving virus may be more stable after drying, thereby creating a trace residue of 
infectious virus (Donaldson 1987). The virus can survive in a pH range from 6 to 9, 
especially at lower temperatures, but becomes increasingly unstable at pH values outside 
that range (Parker 1971, Thomson et al. 2001). The virus is most stable within the pH 







Under certain climatic and meteorological conditions, short-distance droplet nuclei 
transmission may be extended to long-range airborne transmission. Distances of 60 km 
over land (Hugh-Jones and Wright 1970) and 250 km over sea have been reported during 
FMD outbreaks (Donaldson et al. 1982, Gloster et al. 1982). Airborne transmission was 
conjectured after exclusion of human interference, migrating birds and because of the 
relation between wind direction and dispersal.  
This possibility of long distance transport over sea is probably due to the fact that air 
above sea has a high humidity and that the air is more likely to be stable over sea than 
over land (Gloster et al. 1982). The host’s respiratory tract was determined as the main 
source of airborne FMD virus (Donaldson 1986).  
 
Amplifiers, indicators and maintenance hosts 
The role of hogs in airborne transmission has been characterised as FMD amplifiers, 
because they excrete a lot of virus by exhalation. Sheep are implicated as maintenance 
hosts, because they are prone to subclinical infection, whereas cattle are seen as FMD 
indicators because they are the first to show lesions and other characteristic symptoms 
(Sellers and Parker 1969). Forman and others (1974) and Gibbs and others (1975) found 
that the amount of virus excreted as an aerosol during the course of the infection in 
different deer species was similar to those recorded for sheep and cattle. In general, deer 
are compared to sheep in their epidemiological role. This is however very poorly 
substantiated by experimental data. It is more an intuitive assumption, because they are 
both small ruminants (pers. comm. A. Dekker). 
 
Donaldson and others (2001) modelled the effect that different number of animals at the 
source would have on the distance that a plume could travel and still be infectious for 
different species. They did this for pigs, sheep and cattle and used the meteorological 
conditions that are most favourable for airborne dispersion of FMD virus, namely; a 
constant wind direction, a wind speed of 5m/s, a high atmospheric stability, no 
precipitation and a relative humidity above 55%. They calculated that 1000 pigs could 
infect cattle at a distance of 6 kilometres downwind, sheep at 2 kilometres and pigs at less 
than 0.2 kilometres, whereas 1000 cattle or sheep could infect cattle at only 0.7 km and 
sheep at 0.2 km. These different distances can be explained by to the differences between 
species in virus excretion (table 1) and minimum doses needed for infection (table 2). 
The parameters for this model were chosen to represent a worst-case scenario (for policy-
makers), so the distance of transmission is supposed to be less under natural conditions. 
However, previous outbreaks have indicated distances far greater than 6 km (Hugh-Jones 
and Wright 1970, Sellers and Gloster 1980, Gloster 1982). Perhaps these reports 
represent exceptional events, but they show that transmission over larger distances is a 
very real possibility. Ninety percent of the secondary outbreaks occur within 10 kilometres 
of the source (Hugh-Jones and Wright 1970). The remaining 10 percent overland include 
distances up to and even greater than 60 kilometres. This shows that it may be difficult to 
predict accurately what will happen under natural conditions. The situation is more 
complex because animal variability and daily or hourly fluctuations in virus excretion were 
not included in the model and topographical conditions are more important with longer 
distance (Gloster et al. 2003). All in all, modelling has its limitations. 
Another source mentioned for infectious aerosols is the mass destruction by burning of 
infected domestic animal bodies. In the FMD outbreak of 2001 in Great Britain, there were 
two cases, where a holding under the pyre plume became infected on a date consistent 
with the pyre set to fire. The estimated probability of infection by the pyre was calculated 
from a model. Based on this estimation, infection risk for the holding, which became 
infected under the plume, was lower than that for equally susceptible farms that were even 
closer to the pyre, but still did not become infected at the time of the pyre plume. From this 
it was concluded that the pyre was an unlikely source for the infection of the holdings. 





with a total of 106.5 TCID50 FMD virus excreted during a period of 3 hours, regardless of 
the pyre size (Jones et al. 2004). 
  
Soil and water 
Usually soil and surface water are contaminated by infected animal excretes and other 
infected organic material. The content of ruptured blisters also ends up in the environment 
and may be an important source, because the amount of FMD virus is several orders of 
magnitude higher than for example manure (pers. comm. Aldo Dekker). There is however 
limited data on the survival of blister excretes in the environment. Given this lack of data 
and the small amounts of blister excretion, we’ll assume that survival of the virus in animal 
faeces is the second most important source. This makes transmission by soil and water 
the second route of indirect transmission in order of importance. 
Temperature and pH play an important role in the survival of FMD virus. For example, 
FMD virus can survive in bovine slurry for at least 70 days at 17ºC and for 84 days at 4ºC. 
The concentration of virus in cattle slurry after 56 days at 4ºC is 103.5 to 104.25 TCID50 
/animal and at 17ºC is 103.0 to 103.75 TCID50 /animal.  
In pigs slurry with an initial concentration of 104.8 TCID50/50µl, FMD virus can survive for 
2 weeks under 20ºC and more than 4 weeks under 5ºC (Haas et al. 1995). These 
experiments are however done with liquid manure, so the humidity is optimal during the 
whole experiment. These data may be comparable to survival in water, but not on land. 
There survival may be lower, due to dehydration by sunlight and ambient humidity. Parker 
(1971) recovered virus from cattle and pig faeces, but he used a different method that 
make the data not directly comparably to the data with liquid manure (see table 1). 
The review of Alexandersen et al (2003) reports survival times of FMD virus on different 
organic material. It can survive up to 20 weeks on hay or straw, up to 4 weeks on cow’s 
hair at 18 to 20ºC, up to 14 days in dry faeces, up to 39 days in urine, up to 6 months in 
slurry in winter, up to 3 days on soil in summer and up to 28 days in autumn. Bartley and 
others (2002) give a more detailed review on the survival of FMD in animal excretions and 
fomites. They found for example, that FMD virus survived longer when the virus was 
located beneath the soil surface (more than 2 days) than on the soil surface (less than 2 
days) and longer under leaves (19-30 days), then when it was situated on the soils surface 
(less than 5 days) or on plant stems (less than 24 hours). 
Unfortunately, the decay rate of FMD virus under these different conditions cannot be 
estimated, because the initial amount of virus is not given for the majority of the 
experiments (Bartley et al. 2002, Alexandersen et al. 2003). Data on the actual survival of 
FMD virus in surface water under experimental or natural conditions is lacking too. 
Cattle excrete much more virus by faeces than sheep or pigs (Sellers and Parker 1969, 
Parker 1971), while goats seem to excrete less than sheep (Sharma 1981). Unfortunately, 
there is no data available on the amounts that feral animal species excrete. Cattle faeces 
seem to be a potent source for contaminating the environment. In conclusion, transmission 
via soil and water is a likely route, but little can be said on the height and duration of this 
risk. 
 
3.4.2 Transmission via animal vectors 
Birds are often implicated as vectors of FMD. Especially when the primary outbreak is on 
an island like Great-Britain, migrating birds are suspected, because they travel long 
distances and may have an FMD-infected area. Mead (1968) describes the ways in which 
birds would be able to pick up contaminated material and the hundreds of miles that they 
can cross in one hop. In order to effectively transmit an infection however, it is necessary 
that a large number of birds be contaminated with high amounts of virus (Gloster 1982).  
From the research on long distance transmission during a FMD outbreak the dispersal 
pattern appears often correlated to the direction of the migrating birds in that same period. 
But Mead’s (1968) review on different case studies on the occurrence of primary 





vectors over long distances could be dismissed. Gloster and others (1982) also discuss 
the possibility of birds acting as mechanical vectors for transmitting FMD virus over sea 
and added more recent case studies to the discussion. They too concluded that birds were 
unlikely to spread the virus over long distances. Even evidence for transmission over short 
distances is lacking. Mead (1968) was able to report from personal communication that the 
FMD virus could be recovered after 36 hours in the digestive tract of starlings (Sturnus 
vulgaris). It is unclear how much virus was recovered and what the probability is that such 
a bird infects a susceptible animal.  
Long distance spread of FMD by human vectors has been discounted by reviewing case 
studies of long-distance outbreaks (Gloster et al. 1982). Amass and others (2003) showed 
that humans might act as mechanical vectors over short distances. Personnel were 
contaminated by examining infected pigs. They transmitted the FMD virus to susceptible 
sheep and pigs. Different decontamination measures were taken and only the whole-body 
decontamination could prevent transmission to sheep. For pigs hand washing and clean 
outerwear were sufficient to prevent transmission. Human movements were identified as 
the cause for the transmission of infection affected cattle to a nearby zoo in India (Sarma 
et al. 1983). 
Sellers (1971) mentions that virus had been found in rat faeces and urine. In order to 
attain sufficient virus for oral infection, the faeces from 160 rats would be required. The 
animal species thus infected however was not mentioned. He also suggested that 
contamination of dust by rat faeces or urine might lead to infection by inhalation. Since 
then, there are no further indications that rats are indeed credible animal vectors for FMD. 
The normal home range of a rat is only 50 meters, although rats have been known to 
travel 2 to 3 miles (3 to 5 km) a night to forage in farmers fields at harvest time (Maust 
2002, Ballenger 2001). Contamination with FMD may occur when their food is 
contaminated, supposedly infected carrion (Ballenger 2001). 
It is possible to infect hedgehogs and they have been shown to transmit FMD virus after 
experimental infection. They can eat fresh carrion and may travel 3 km while foraging 
within a home range of 24 ha in a single night (Martin 2004). In addition, hedgehogs got 
infected by inhaling the virus that was exhaled by an experimentally infected hedgehog 
(Donaldson 1979). It is however unclear if exposure to other species under natural 
conditions would also cause an infection and if an infected hedgehog excretes enough 
virus to infect other susceptible species. 
No further animal vectors have been investigated in the literature. Sutmoller and others 
(2000) speculate on lions and other scavengers that act as mechanical carriers of virus 
after the kill of viraemic buffalo calves. Experimental data is however lacking. No mention 
has been made about the possible partaking of pets, insects or other possible vectors.  
 
3.5 Infection dose 
Of the different infection routes, the most is known about the respiratory route. There is 
only sporadic data on the oral route and no data at all on the minimum infection dose 
(MID) for infection via the venal route. Infection via the venal route is difficult to simulate 
under experimental conditions, whereas the contribution to the transmission of FMD virus 
compared to the other routes is probably negligible. The chance that an animal is infected 
by direct contact with its blood and not first by digestion or inhalation seems very slim. The 
respiratory route is generally considered the most common infection route (Thomson et al. 
2001), because infected animals commonly excrete the virus by exhalation. The risk of 
inhaling aerosols is more likely to cause an infection in certain species, due to different 
MIDs.  
As can be seen in table 2, the MID for pigs via respiratory infection route has not been 
determined well. One of the reasons is that previous studies used artificially generated 
aerosols to assess the MID for pigs. ‘The pathogenesis of FMD virus in animals exposed 
to artificially generated aerosols is however markedly different from that in animals 





less sensitive for quantifying FMD virus than the one used nowadays. Even in a later 
study, the MID could not be determined, because the authors were unable to produce 
natural aerosols containing high enough doses of FMD virus (Alexandersen et al. 2002). 
The minimal infection dose to infect 50 percent of a population (MID50) has not even been 
quantified accurately for pigs (table 2). These results in fact reflect the low probability that 
aerosols can infect pigs. Alexandersen and Donaldson (2002) showed that 650 TCID50 in 
5 minutes was not enough to infect ten pigs, meaning that this dose might be near the 
threshold level for the immune response to clear FMD in pigs.  
 
Table 2. The minimum infection doses of different species by different infection routes for FMD. 
MID  = Minimum infection dose to infect nearly all animals * no data  
MID50  = Minimum infection dose to infect 50% of population  
a TCID50 (Alexandersen 2003)    e TCID50 (Donaldson 1986) 
b ID50  (Donaldson 1987)   f TCID50 (Gibson and Donaldson 1986) 
c TCID50 (Donaldson et al 2001)   g TCID50 (Alexandersen and Donaldson 2002) 
d TCID50 (Alexandersen et al. 2002)    h TCID50 (Kitching and Hughes 2002) 
 
The published MIDs for FMD virus for sheep and cattle are 10 and 25 TCID50 by natural 
aerosol (Donaldson 1986). However the calculations of these MIDs were based on the 
number of clinically affected animals. In order to compare the sensitivity of cattle and 
sheep with pigs, these MIDs for cattle and sheep are converted to MID50 with the addition 
of the number of subclinically-infected animals. Alexandersen and others (2002) re-
analyzed the data and calculated values of 5 and 7 TCID50 as MID50 for cattle and 
sheep, respectively. 
Pigs have shown to be relatively resistant to infection by airborne FMD virus compared to 
sheep and cattle (Donaldson and Alexandersen 2001). They however seem more 
susceptible to infection via the oral route, then sheep and cattle (Alexandersen 2003). 
There is no direct data on the epidemiology of FMD in goats. The minimum infection dose 
reported on goats by Kitching and Hughes (2002) does not seem to be based on 
experimental data. As in all the literature involving goats Sharma (1981), Barnett and Cox 
(1999) also Kitching and Hughes (2002) seem to consider sheep and goats as equals. 
This assumption is however not substantiated by any data. Goats are no substitute for 
cattle, because goats clear the virus much faster than cattle (Sharma 1981). The main 
focus of these articles is on sheep.  
Unfortunately, there is also no data on the minimum infection dose for deer or other wild 
animals for either infection route. The course of the disease in deer seems comparable to 
sheep and cattle (Gibbs et al. 1975). For example, cattle that were in contact with the 
small deer species (roe, muntjac and sika) reacted at the same rate to infection as the 
Susceptible species Oral route Venal route Respiratory route 
 MID MID MID MID50 
Cattle 
 








Sheep n.d. n.d. 10 e, f 7 d 
Pigs 
 








Goat n.d. n.d. 20 h n.d. 
Roe deer n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Red deer n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Fallow deer n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Sika deer n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Muntjac deer n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Camel n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Water buffalo n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 





conspecific deer. Similarly, the bigger fallow and red deer developed subclinical FMD and 
the appearance and distribution of lesions were similar to those in sheep (Forman and 
Gibbs 1974), so these deer species resemble sheep in their reaction to FMD virus 
infection. In addition, sheep and cattle have the same levels of virus excretion and the 
same infection doses. Because of this, in absence of real data, it might be reasonable to 
suppose that MID in deer is of the same magnitude as in sheep and cattle. 
 
3.6 Carrier state 
Alexandersen and others (2003) report in their review the maximum duration of carrier 
states in different species. This is 3.5 years for cattle, 9 months for sheep, 4 months for 
goats, 5 years for African buffalo, 2 months in water buffalo. Some deer species may 
become carrier, but the duration of the state has not been determined. In the experiment 
of Gibbs and others (1975) red deer, fallow deer and sika deer were virus carrier during 
the duration of the experiment (28 days). Pigs are considered to not be FMD carriers, 
although there seems to be recent research that suggests that pigs too can become 
carriers (Musser 2004). The FMD carrier state is always accompanied by virus antibodies 
in serum and OP fluid (Wittmann 1990) 
The percentage of animals that become a carrier under experimental conditions is variable 
but averages around 50%. The amount of virus from the respiratory tract is usually low in 
carriers, 10-100 TCID50/ml (Alexandersen et al. 2003). Persistence of virus in pharynx 
was found for fallow deer, sika deer, sheep and cattle at levels of 104.0 TCID50 /sample 
and occasionally in red deer at levels of 102.0 TCID50 /sample (Gibbs et al. 1975). The 
carrier state for smaller deer, like muntjac and roe deer was not shown in the experiment 
(Gibbs et al. 1975). 
Carrier animals are not very infective. Attempts to demonstrate transmission from known 
carrier cattle or sheep to susceptible animals held in close, direct contact under controlled 
experimental conditions have all failed (Wittmann 1990, Alexandersen et al. 2003). There 
is evidence in African buffalo that although transmission from carrier to susceptible animal 
is inefficient it does occasionally happen (Dawe et al. 1994, Hedger and Condy 1985), but 
only with prolonged and intimate contact (Thomson et al. 1992, Thomson 1995, Vosloo et 
al. 1996). In this experiment carrier and susceptible animals were kept for months in the 
same pen.  
Vaccination has shown to protect animals against disease development and reduce 
contact transmission in infected animals (Salt et al. 1998, Cox et al. 1999). Virus 
replication is thus limited, but not stopped. The transmission is reduced to minimum levels.  
Vaccinated pigs and sheep were unable to transmit FMD to the in-contact susceptible pigs 
or sheep, respectively. The aerosol produced by these pigs had a maximum of only 2.1 
TCID50/ml (Salt et al. 1998). No data was presented on the virus excreted by vaccinated 
sheep (Cox et al. 1999). Vaccines have not been tested on deer and bison, so it is unclear 
if this preventive measure could be effective for these species (Haigh et al. 2002). 
 
3.7 Ranking transmission routes 
For primary outbreaks, illegal trade or transport of animals and animal products is the most 
likely source. Also, the ban on swill feeding proved its rationality.  
Direct contact is the most important route of transmission for FMD virus, commonly by 
exhaled respiratory nuclei. Contact with ruptured blisters may facilitate the infection of 
animals that are near an infected animal. Transmission seems to only be dependent on 
the duration of exposure. A very short period of exposure may not cause the virus to 
invade the body of a host and to infect a host’s cell and replicate. Sheep and goats are 
important in this type of transmission, because infection often doesn’t show.  
The second most important transmission route is the formation of aerosols from these 
respiratory nuclei. The focus of research is mainly on airborne transmission, because this 





biggest risk comes from infected pigs in the winter, as pigs excrete a lot of airborne FMD 
virus and the conditions for virus survival are more favourable in winter on the base of the 
relative humidity. That is, when pigs become infected during an outbreak, which is not 
necessarily the case, because they are less susceptible to the respiratory infection route. 
Cattle and sheep and goats are very susceptible to respiratory infection. Deer, sheep and 
bovines presumably excrete 100 times less airborne virus than pigs and wild boars but 
may cause infected aerosol formation in sufficient densities. The susceptibility for deer 
may be comparable to cattle and sheep as the virus excretion is also comparable. No 
assessment can be made for the remaining feral animals that are susceptible to FMD.  
The third most important transmission route might be the survival of FMD virus in the 
environment, i.e. soil and water, as the virus can remain viable for prolonged periods. This 
depends on various environmental conditions and it has never been identified as a route of 
transmission during an epidemic. The rest of the transmission routes are hard to rank 
according to importance. The survival of FMD in dead animals depends on the 
temperature and the chemical changes during rigor mortis. It is unclear how these 
chemical changes take place in each host species and how infectious the meat may be. 
Hedgehogs are the only identified animal vectors that may act as a reservoir for FMD, but 
it is unclear if they can be infected by other species under natural circumstances and 
subsequently transmit it to other species. For this reason, the role of hedgehogs as vector 
remains obscure. Humans, birds and rats may mechanically transmit FMD virus. Rats and 
birds may produce contaminated faeces. Humans and birds do not seem to facilitate long 
distance transmission.  
The role of animal vectors is however complex and the available data are too limited to 
assess their feasibility. No research is done on the occurrence of sexual transmission 
under field conditions. This route may be irrelevant, compared to direct contact 
transmission. The FMD carrier-state implies that FMD virus is mainly restricted to the 
respiratory tissues, thus this route is even less relevant for carriers. Trans-placental 
transmission from mother to foetus does not seem to occur.   
For pigs and wild boars, oral infection is the most likely route of infection. Determination of 
the minimum infection dose via the respiratory route may not be possible with the current 
techniques, because it is so high.  
The outbreak of FMD in the UK in 2001 is a good example of the roles that different 
species can play in an epidemic. This outbreak was the first since 1968 and the primary 
infection was in a pig farm, probably caused by swill feeding (the exact source still 
unknown, Leforban and Gerbier 2002). Airborne virus from these pigs infected nearby 
cattle and sheep. Luckily, the virus strain caused the infected pigs to emit less airborne 
virus than expected from previous outbreaks and thus spread by airborne transmission 
was over much shorter distances (1 to 9 km, Gloster et al. 2003). The sheep only showed 
mild symptoms. This fact, combined with the decreased vigilance after so many years 
without FMD outbreaks, caused the disease to pass unnoticed. These sheep were taken 
through a number of markets, resulting in a major spread that reached Ireland, France and 
the Netherlands. 
 
3.8 Interface of domestic and (semi-) wild 
animals 
Above, a ranking is given of the routes by which FMD virus is transmitted. By knowing this, 
it may be possible to assess the transmission risk when either wildlife or livestock is the 
source of infection. The risk that domestic animals infect wildlife and vice versa depends 
on opportunities for direct contact, presence of vectors and in absence of both, on the 
distance between the populations. While airborne transmission from domestic animals to 
wildlife is perfectly possible, the reverse may be an unlikely event. Wild boars (the 
amplifiers of airborne spread) live solitary or in groups of 6 to 20 individuals with a median 





Donaldson and others (2001) showed that 10 infected pigs were (in theory) sufficient to 
infect cattle at 0.5 km distance, long-distance aerosol transmission in the order of 
kilometres from free-living wild boars is quite unlikely. Not only because of the low density 
of boars, preventing rapid spread of infection among the boar population, but because 
infection in swine occurs most likely by direct contact with an infected animal or by eating 
infected meat, not by inhaling infectious aerosols.  
Semi-wild cattle and sheep, as well as some deer species, due to their tendency to flock 
together in herds, might become a source of infective aerosols. The small roe deer and 
muntjac deer live solitary or in small groups in forest areas (Forman et al. 1974, OmniShift 
2004). Roe deer have their own territories and the median density is 15 individuals per 
100ha (range 0 to 35 deer per 100ha, Cromsigt et al. 2001). Only in winter do they form 
herds of 10-15 individuals in open fields (pers. comm. M. Montizaan). The risk from the 
bigger fallow and red deer may be more substantial. They tend to herd in open woodland 
and graze with cattle and sheep (Forman et al. 1974, Gibbs et al. 1975). Female red deer 
live in groups of 2 to 50 individuals, whereas male red deer generally live separate from 
the females in groups of 2 to 40 individuals. The herd size of red deer depends on the food 
availability. In forest areas, the group size is commonly between 5 to 10 individuals (pers. 
comm. M. Montizaan). The median density of red deer is approximately 4.9 individuals per 
100ha (Crowmsigt et al. 2001).  Fallow deer commonly gather in herds of only 4 to 5 
individuals. But in good feeding areas 70 to 100 deer may gather (OmniShift 2004).  
Separately, these species do not seem to represent a risk for the formation of aerosols 
that can disperse over long distances, but the congregation of all these species in open 
areas during the winter (food shortage) or during periods of concentrated food availability 
may pose more substantial risk for airborne transmission from wildlife to domestic animals. 
The density of all susceptible animals under such conditions needs to be assessed. For 
now, we can observe that the nature reserve Oostvaardersplassen in the Netherlands 
contains considerable higher herbivore densities than nature reserves elsewhere in 
Eurasia, but still considerably less than domestic animals in the meadow. The total 
populations of Heck cattle, red deer and wild boar in 2004 were respectively 681, 1430 
and zero (pers. comm. F de Roder). Thus about 2000 susceptible animals may inhabit the 
reserve, which has a surface of 5600 hectares. In theory, 1000 cattle or sheep could infect 
cattle at 0.7 km and sheep at 0.2 km (Donaldson et al. 2001). Even when these animals 
flock together, the herd won’t be large enough to transmit aerosols to domestic population, 
as 1.4 km may not even be sufficient to transmit an aerosol outside the borders of the 
nature reserve. Moreover, it is unclear if all susceptible animals will congregate during 
winter and all animals will need to be infected at the same time.  
As densities of domestic animals are far greater than those of populations in nature 
reserves, formation of highly infectious aerosols is more likely to occur. Ninety percent of 
the secondary outbreaks were found to occur within a 10 kilometres radius around a 
domestic infection centre (Hugh-Jones and Wright 1970). The infection risk for (semi-) wild 
animals within this radius may be higher as these animals have more contact with the 
open air than animals that live in stables. Domestic animals in meadows or enclosed 
outlets may play a considerable role in the epidemiology, because they live in high 
densities in the open air. So aerosols are formed easily and aerosols also easily infect 
these populations.  
The infection risk for (semi-) wild animals may be different, due to the lower densities and 
difference in habitat structure. Forests diminish the exposure to wind (i.e. aerosols), 
whereas aerosols can easily reach susceptible animals that roam in open landscapes. The 
probability, that airborne virus infects a roe or muntjac deer, is therefore small because 
they live solitary or in small groups in forest areas (Forman et al. 1974). In winter, the 
infection risk is higher as they congregate in open fields and FMD virus is more stable. 
Airborne transmission from livestock to wildlife seems more likely than vice versa. 
The transmission between domestic animals and (semi-) wild animals via soil seems 





distances in large amounts, unless there are natural phenomena like sandstorms and 
hurricanes. The dissemination of contaminated soil may be negligible for the transmission 
between livestock and wildlife. Nevertheless, transmission via water is conceivable. 
Contaminated manure may run-off into the water of nearby ditches or small rivers. The 
water may flow to another area and if the dilution is not too great, it may be infectious 
enough to infect animals that drink this water. The lack of field data on the survival rate of 
FMD virus in water makes it hard to assess a risk. Even so, it can be presumed that 
livestock form the most potent source, as they have the highest probability of producing 
contaminated soil and water with high virus concentrations (e.g. by farmers land spreading 
manure over their land). Wild animals tend to spread their excretions and secretions over 
a large area.  
Some animal vectors may be more likely to get contaminated with FMD virus if either the 
domestic animals or the (semi-) wild animals are the infection source. However, it remains 
questionable whether animals that have access to either domestic or (semi-) wild animals 
also have access to the other. Rats are associated with humans, so contaminated rats are 
more likely to originate from farms. Contamination with FMD seems most likely to come 
from contaminated carrion (Ballenger 2001). Farmers however are supposed to remove 
dead animals as quickly as possible and to control rats at the farm. The density of rats in 
nature reserves is smaller, so the chance that a substantial number of rats become 
infected through contaminated meat is unlikely. Hedgehogs and birds are most likely to 
have access to (semi-) wild animals and domestic animals that live in meadows and 
enclosed outlets. Humans may facilitate transmission over short distances. But what is the 
chance that a naive person is first in close contact with (semi-) wild animals and thereafter 
in close contact with a domestic animal (or the other way around)? It seems possible for 
veterinary staff, but they probably apply decontamination measures. On a more general 
note, the notion of animal vectors that transmit FMD by their faeces may be unlikely for 
susceptible species other that swine. Wild boars and pigs may eat (substantial amounts 
of) faeces, but other species don’t. 
In conclusion, the probability of FMD virus transmission over long-distances is higher 
when livestock is infected then when wildlife is the infection source. Thomson et al (2003) 
support this view in their review on FMD in wildlife. Wild animals were not responsible for 
any of the re-infections in South East Asia, South America and Western Europe. 
Moreover, there are a lot of examples where FMD has been observed in wild animals with 
a nearby outbreak in livestock as the infection source. A few examples are wild goats in 
Ireland (Griffin and O’Reilly 2003), an outbreak in an Indian biological park (Kar et al. 
1983) and all outbreaks of FMD in European bison in Poland (pers. comm. J. Kita). Many 
situation-specific factors influence actual infection risks, such as geography, habitat 
structure, population size and density. In general, wild animals have a lower risk of 
becoming infected, because the animal densities are considerably lower in nature. Even if 
a population becomes infected, it will probably die out naturally, due to these low densities 
(Thomson et al, 2003, Wobeser, 2002) 
 
3.8.1 Persistence in wildlife 
A major concern is that wild populations may act as reservoir for new FMD outbreaks in 
livestock. This may be possible when a FMD infection persists. In a nature reserve, 
infected animals may go unnoticed by gamekeepers, even more when it is subclinical. In 
the persistence of FMD the carrier state may play a role. FMD carriers excrete about 100 
times less than when the same species are clinically infected. Thus the transmission rate 
from carriers is slower, as exposure time between infected and susceptible animals needs 
to be longer. This decreased spread may cause the infection to be self-limiting, when the 
basic reproduction rate falls below one (Ro<1). The disease will however persist when 
transmission has not decreased enough (Ro=1). 
Dead bodies do not seem to facilitate persistence, as the mortality rate is very low with 





only form a serious infection risk when there is a big chance that wild boars find the 
carcass quickly after the time of death. This maximum interval between death and 
recovery is dependant on the time of year (just as the survival of FMD in the abiotic 
environment). In the summer, the temperatures are high and the humidity is low, meaning 
that survival is low. In the winter, the temperatures are low and humidity is high, so 
survival is higher. These favourable conditions are more common in Eastern Europe than 
in Western Europe.  
From this information, it cannot be assessed how long FMD is likely to persist in wildlife. 
More information is needed for this assessment, for example, the threshold density under 
which FMD fades out and the probability that carriers infect susceptible animals. 
Nevertheless, ‘a general observation has been that wherever in the world FMD has been 
eradicated from livestock it has generally disappeared from wildlife in those regions’ 
(Thomson et al. 2003). The virus is unlikely to persist in wildlife and probably needs 
constant re-infection from domestic species. The African buffalo is the only known 
exception. This is also supported by field evidence from the 2001 epidemic. FMD did not 
persist in populations of wild boars and roe deer in the conservation areas in the 
Netherlands (Elbers et al. 2003). 
 
3.9 FMD policy 
The 2001 outbreak in the UK engendered a lot of discussion, because it was the first 
major outbreak in 20 years. The killing of so many healthy animals caused a lot of protest 
outside as well as inside the agricultural sector. The impending threat to valuable or 
endangered species, the obligation to kill cattle that took a lifetime’s work to breed, as well 
as the killing of pets raised a lot of protest (Pluimers et al, 2002). As for endangered 
species, a joint conference of OIE and FAO recognized the obligation to conserve wildlife 
and endangered or otherwise valuable species and recommended to consider the option 
of vaccination of such animals (OIE/ FAO, 2001). The Terrestrial Animal Health Code now 
provides more protection to endangered species (OIE, 2004).  
Even without such provisions, emergency vaccination could have halted the epidemic 
much quicker than killing without vaccination. However, even though the OIE FMD 
protocol as well as the EU did permit emergency vaccination, authorities proved very 
reluctant to use this option. Uncertainty about the trade consequences were the main 
reason. In the UK, veterinary authorities were still discussing vaccination six months after 
the outbreak (Leforban, 2002). The Netherlands resorted to emergency vaccination when 
stamping out failed to control the epidemic. It was necessary to ask permission from the 
European Commission, which gave some days of delay. Afterwards, the law permitted 
them a choice between observing the compulsory waiting period, or to kill and destroy all 
vaccinated animals. Where the cattle farmers preferred the first option, the hog farmers 
voted against it, because a prolonged quarantine status would delay them from restocking 
their stables. So, the farmers’ organization LTO recommended killing, which was carried 
FMD free zone where vaccination is practised  
An FMD free zone where vaccination is practised can be established in an FMD free 
country where vaccination is not practised or in a country of which parts are infected. 
Vaccination of zoo animals, animals belonging to rare species or breeds, or animals in
research centres as a precaution for conservation purposes is an example of 
implementation of such a zone. The free zone where vaccination is practised is 
separated from the rest of the country and, if relevant, from neighbouring infected 
countries by a buffer zone, or physical or geographical barriers, and animal health 
measures that effectively prevent the entry of the virus must be implemented. A 
country in which an FMD free zone where vaccination is practised is to be established 
should: 





out accordingly. Authorities were so eager to quickly recover the disease-free status that 
measures to preserve valuable breeding stock, for instance through embryo preservation, 
were not even considered (Pluimers et al, 2001).  
According to EU directive 85/511/EEC, the FMD-free period after stamping out all 
vaccinated animals was 3 months, in case vaccinated animals were kept alive, 12 months, 
but only for member states with FMD status with vaccination. In 2003, the EU adopted a 
new directive on FMD (2003/85/EC). Following OIE guidelines it allows establishment of 
vaccinated FMD-free zones, where vaccination is practised to protect valuable animals. 
After an outbreak, the waiting period in the protected zone before recovery to a vaccinated 
FMD-free status, is shortened to 6 months. The directive requires that all member states 
develop FMD contingency plans for FMD and have them approved by the European 
Commission. There will be a central authority in charge, with full competence to carry out 
any measures deemed necessary.  
The British Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has developed 
such a plan, following extensive stakeholder consultation after the 2001 epidemic. It 
leaves the choice between protective vaccination or stamping out open and provides for 
stakeholder involvement at local or regional level (Defra, 2004). The Dutch contingency 
plan identifies different scenarios and prescribes measures to both domestic and non-
domestic animals. In all scenarios, only Red List and CITES species are allowed 
protective vaccination; all other vaccinated susceptible animals have to be killed (Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality, 2002). Managers of nature reserves have to 
relinquish their authority. In case of an FMD outbreak, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
and Food quality takes over the authority from the State Forestry Management. This 
means in practice that the entire nature reserve will be closed and that only two persons 
are allowed to enter, with special protective clothing, disinfected cars and upon exiting 
they have to shower and change clothes. When the outbreak spreads to the Nature 
reserve, the Ministry has all authority and nature managers fear that it will decide to kill all 
herbivores (pers. comm. F. de Roder).  
Emergency vaccination has been investigated for FMD in cattle, pigs and sheep (Salt et al. 
1998, Cox et al. 1999). Pigs are not considered carriers of FMD virus (Salt et al. 1998). 
Pigs were seldom protected before 21 and 28 days after vaccination, therefore ‘the 
circumstances under which emergency vaccines could be expected to prevent virus 
spread would highly depend on the circumstances’ (Doel et al. 1994). Emergency 
vaccination has provided a rapid and protective immunity in sheep as early as three days 
following vaccination, meaning that it limits the transmission of the disease to susceptible 
non-vaccinated sheep. Cattle were protected four days after vaccination, but a subsequent 
challenge with virus caused the virus to persist and there appeared to be a correlation with 
the time interval between vaccination and challenge. Even with a time interval of 4 months 
persistently infected cattle occurred, although the number of animals was considerably 
lower (Doel et al. 1994). From these experiments it seems that emergency vaccination can 
reduce the transmission rate, but can also cause infections to persist. Emergency 
vaccination may therefore only be implemented to reduce the transmission rate, but 
afterwards animals must either be killed, or kept in quarantine for an appropriate period. 
 
3.9.1 Prevention and control 
During the last epidemic in 2001 many veterinarians called for preventive vaccination 
(Cunningham 2001, Foster and McNaughton 2001, Stephenson and Davies 2001, 
Wardrope and Windsor 2001, Wood et al. 2001). A meticulous evaluation about the 
desirability of general preventive vaccination in the light of the 2001 outbreak led to the 
conclusion, that it would probably have made no significant difference, had the UK 
practised preventive vaccination (Leforban, 2002). As to wildlife, there are various reasons 
why preventive vaccination is unadvisable. It may be impossible to discriminate between 
animals that have been vaccinated and subsequently infected animals and animals that 





to be relatively inefficient and the reliance on vaccines exclusively is dangerous, as has 
been shown from experience in southern Africa (Thomson et al. 2003).  
The danger lies firstly in that the immunity only lasts a short period of time. FMD immunity 
lasts approximately 4 months in cattle and a few weeks in pigs (Ferguson et al. 2001, 
Alexandersen et al. 2003). Only when individual cattle have received several inoculations 
does the level of immunity remain high against challenges with homologous virus. 
Thereafter annual vaccination is required to keep levels of immunity at a satisfactory level. 
The second problem is that as recovery from one FMD virus type does not protect against 
another type, it is necessary to vaccinate with multiple types and serotypes. Notably, the 
vaccination of wildlife has never been conducted in Europe and an attempt in Southern 
Africa gave inconclusive results (Thomson et al. 2003). 
Animals that are infected with the FMD virus usually survive, but may suffer a high 
morbidity. Emergency vaccination may protect animals from the clinical signs and may 
reduce the transmission rate during an outbreak, but this measure is not effective in 
protecting wildlife, as long as as they have to be shot afterwards.  
 
3.9.2 Best policy for wildlife 
The best wildlife policy is to prevent an infection from occurring. In general, it is best to 
prevent regular contact with domestic animals as much as reasonably achievable. During 
an outbreak domestic animals should be isolated from wild animals by stabling or 
confining them in a pen. Emergency vaccination to domestic animals should be applied 
immediately to prevent the disease from spreading. Wild animals should be restricted in 
their movements by closing off corridors and disturbing the animals as little as possible. In 
case of an outbreak among wild animals non-intervention is probably the best option. The 
disease will presumably die-out among wild populations when the domestic infection 
source no longer forms a risk. FMD seems unable to naturally persist in Eurasian wildlife 
and wild animals are unlikely to form a risk by aerosol transmission or other forms of long 
distance transmission. If direct contact between infected wild animals and livestock cannot 
be excluded, emergency vaccination of domestic animals in risk of contact can be applied.  
In cases where the disease is expected to cause huge damage to endangered or 





4 Classical Swine Fever 
Like FMD, CSF is a bone of contention between nature conservationists and public 
opinion on the one hand and veterinary authorities on the other one. As with FMD 
outbreaks, CSF outbreaks are accompanied with massive slaughter and destruction of 
healthy farm animals and impending threat of extermination to wild boars. 
Another issue is the reintroduction of wild boar in many areas and connecting zones 
between local populations in Western Europe. Due to habitat fragmentation, the 
conservation status of wild boar is unfavourable in several countries (e.g. the Netherlands, 
Denmark and the UK). Habitat size is often too small for preservation in the long run. In 
the Netherlands the wild boar populations are isolated in the Veluwe and Meinweg 
conservation areas from other populations in Belgium and Germany. Enlargement is at 
least needed to keep the populations viable, but implementation of the ecological network 
would be a more constructive way of upholding genetic variance and population size.  
Projects to that end are however often opposed for fear of classical swine fever (CSF). 
The conservation of wild boars is important, because they form an integral part of an 
ecosystem. These scavengers clear up dead animals and cause other types of dynamics 
than large herbivores. They root in the ground, while searching for food. This behaviour 
ventilates the soil and creates spots of bare soil, which facilitates the establishment of 
certain plant species. The wild boars’ ecological role cannot easily be replaced by other 
species.  
 
4.1 CSF, the disease 
Classical swine fever (CSF) or Hog cholera is caused by viruses of the genus Pestisvirus 
of the Flaviviridae family. This very infectious disease only infects domestic pigs (Sus 
scrofa domestica) and wild boar (Sus scrofa). It has a high mortality rate, predominantly 
among young animals. Once recovered, the animal requires a long-time immunity. High 
mortality has also been reported in wild boar. Whether wild populations harbor chronically 
infected animals without clinical signs has never been demonstrated, though it seems 
possible (Artois et al, 2002). CSF is endemic in wild boar and free-roaming domestic hogs 
in Sardinia since 1983. Also elsewhere in Europe, some populations of wild boar are not 
CSF-free (Artois et al, 2002). It is feared that via the ecological network infected wild boars 
may spread the disease to domestic pigs in disease-free countries (Damhuis et al. 2004). 
There are different strains with different virulence, but there are no serotypes defined. 
Domestic pigs and wild boars are the main hosts and the course of the disease is similar 
in both species.  
Different strains can cause an acute, chronic or congenital form of CSF (OIE 2002). The 
acute form causes severe symptoms like anorexia, lesions of the skin, fever and death 5-
15 days after onset of the illness. The mortality of young pigs can approach 100%. The 
chronic form has less severe symptoms, like dullness, capricious appetite, pyrexia, 
diarrhoea for up to 1 month. An apparent recovery will occur with eventual relapse and 
death. The congenital form causes piglets to be clinically normal but the virus to persist in 
the blood with no antibody response. No apparent symptoms can be identified. Only poor 
growth over a period of weeks or months is observed, where after death ordinarily occurs. 
Notably, maternal antibodies have been shown to passively protect piglets from a post-
natal CSF infection for several weeks (Depner et al. 2000). Maternal antibodies protect 
piglets against mortality during the first weeks of life, but not necessarily against virus 
replication and shedding (transient infection). CSF is a very deadly disease with a high 
mortality rate, often eradicating 90% or more of the local population (Lang et al. 2000, 
Chenut et al. 1999).  
Pigs that do not die within four weeks of infection either become convalescent and develop 
high neutralising antibody titres, or they become chronically ill and remain persistently 





et al. 2002). The pigs that survive an infection develop immunity that can last for several 
years or even for life (van Oirschot 1999). Domestic pigs and wild boars are considered 
natural hosts of CSF and as yet no other species have been identified as reservoir hosts 
(Loan and Storm 1968, Dewulf et al. 2001). There are varying reports on wild boar as a 
reservoir for CSF.  
Persistence of CSF virus seems to depend on the area and the interface with domestic 
pigs. In certain areas, CSF has occurred in wild boar for short periods of time (months to a 
few years), but the disease has gradually died out later on (Laddomada 2000). In other 
areas the disease has shown to persist for a long time. In Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania in Germany CSF has been found in about two-third of the region during the 
second half of the 90s (Laddomada 2000). The disease has been endemic in eastern 
Sardinia from 1985, due to the spread of CSF infection to wild boar and occasionally to 
free-roaming pig populations (Laddomada 2000, Artois et al. 2002). It is also endemic in 
regions of France on the border with Germany (Chenut et al. 1999). The situation for many 
countries outside Western Europe is unknown, but outbreaks have been reported in recent 
years (Laddomada 2000).   
Earlier history of CSF in wild boar has been associated with the persistence of the disease 
in domestic pigs (Edwards et al. 2000). The first report of CSF was done in 1830 in Ohio. 
The first European report was done in 1860. This does not mean that before that date it 
did not occur, people probably did not know what kind of disease the pigs had. It seems 
plausible that it originally came from Europe or Asia, but the true source remains unknown. 
The UK and the USA succeeded in eradicating CSF by killing all infected animals. The EU 
started eradication in 1980 and succeeded in establishing a disease-free status in most of 
the region by mass vaccinations, followed by abandoning vaccination and the adoption of 
a stamping out policy. The CSF-free status did not prevent outbreaks from occurring. In 
1997 a massive epidemic in a Dutch region with extremely high pig densities led to the 
killing and destruction of millions of animals, before the epidemic was halted. Despite 
provision of emergency vaccination, it was not used because of trade consequences. 
Public outrage raised ethical questions and gave rise to research into alternative control 
strategies (Klinkenberg 2003).  
The role that CSF seems to play in the ecosystem is regulation of the population density of 
wild boar. This is due to the high mortality rates caused by the disease. The development 
of subclinical infections may cause wild boar to be a reservoir for domestic pigs or for wild 
boar when the population density is again high enough. Unfortunately there are only 
sporadic experiments with wild boar, meaning that most data are derived from 
experiments with domestic pigs. This data are extrapolated to wild boars, because wild 
boars and domestic pigs are so closely related. 
 
4.2 Direct transmission 
When pigs are infected with a virulent strain of virus, they usually show high levels of virus 
in both blood and tissues. Infected pigs can have 103.5 to 103.6 TCID50 /sample in their 
blood (González et al. 2001). Also, large amounts of virus are excreted in the oral fluids 
and smaller amounts in urine and nasal fluids. Viral excretion continues until death or until 
specific antibodies are developed (Terpstra C. 1988). Dewulf et al. (2001) mentioned that 
the average amount of virus excreted by an infected pig under field conditions is 
comparable to 103 TCID50/ml. The way by which this would be excreted is not mentioned. 
The amounts of virus excreted with urine and faeces are low, as compared with the titres 
in blood, kidney and intestinal tissue (Ressang 1973). Additionally, preliminary results 
indicate that the virus is readily inactivated in manure under aerobic conditions (Have 
1984). The virus may however survive for longer periods in manure and experimental 
studies suggested that inactivation occurred more rapidly in the liquid phase of slurry than 
in the solid phase, with infectivity being lost in about 15 days (Have 1984). The amounts 





4.2.1 Sexual contact 
Boars that are infected with CSF virus can excrete virus with semen and can, 
subsequently, transmit the virus to sows via artificial insemination and additionally to the 
foetuses that develop from this (De Smit et al. 1999). The CSF virus isolate used in this 
experiment did not cause any typical signs of CSF in the infected boars and sows, so the 
course may be different if a more virulent strain is used. However, in this experiment all 
piglets developed acute CSF and died or were killed (being at the point of death) within 
approximately three weeks. 
 
4.2.2 Mother-foetus 
Transplacental transmission has been observed regularly, but the effect CSF has on the 
foetuses or piglets depends on the virulence of the virus strain and the period of gestation 
the infection occurs (van Oirschot and Terpstra 1977, Terpstra 1987, De Smit et al. 1999, 
Kaden et al. 2001). The later sows are infected during pregnancy, the more uninfected 
piglets are born (van Oirschot 1979). Pregnant sows infected by virulent strains die or, 
when the sows survive, either abort or produce mummified, stillborn, weak or diseased 
piglets that succumb shortly after birth (Dewulf et al. 2001b). In the case of infection with a 
low virulent strain, pregnant sows are subclinically infected and generally pass unnoticed. 
Their healthy looking offspring are however infected with CSF. They may shed large 
amounts of virus for weeks or months without being detected (Terpstra 1987). The 
development of symptoms can appear also later in life (late onset, van Oirschot and 
Terpstra 1977). Piglets have been shown to develop a persistent infection until they died 
from the infection (van Oirschot 1979). 
 
4.2.3 Dead bodies 
‘CSF virus may be regarded as moderately fragile, like many enveloped viruses, but is 
able to survive for prolonged periods in a favourable environment, cool, moist and protein 
rich, as found in stored meat’ (Terpstra 1987, Edwards 2002). Virus survival times of more 
than 4 years have been recorded in frozen pork (Edgar et al. 1949). It has been reported 
that artificially contaminated slaughterhouse waste kept at 20 ºC for 3 weeks was already 
non-infectious after four days (Prost and Bojarski 1967). The infection risk of dead bodies 
in a nature conservation area may be substantial during winter, when virus survival is 
longer. The chance of susceptible animals taking up infected material is therefore bigger. 
Wild boars may eat the carrion and become infected. However a risk analysis has never 
been conducted on this subject. 
 
4.3 Indirect transmission 
It has been a mystery how CSF virus was able to spread over long distances without the 
help of humans. The movement of pigs and contaminated materials has often been seen 
as the cause of long distance transmission. A lot of research has been done on animal 
vectors, because animals have often been incriminated. 
 
4.3.1 Transmission via the abiotic environment 
The survival of the CSF virus in the environment is affected by many physical and 
chemical variables, including temperature, humidity, pH and presence of organic matter. 
The virus is generally stable in the range pH 5-10. It is rapidly inactivated below pH 3 and 
above pH 10 (Slavin 1938, Kubin 1967, Edwards 2000, OIE 2002). A sharp pH peak for 
virus survival in blood was found at pH 5.2 (Chapin et al. 1939). However, the virus 
survival seems to depend on the temperature as well as on the pH (Depner et al. 1992). 
The effect of pH below 4 on the survival of CSF virus is much more marked at 4 ºC than at 





21 ºC (Depner et al 1992). Notably, these half-lives may be far higher in meat. 
Additionally, ultra-violet light will rapidly inactivate the virus (Kubin 1967). 
As mentioned above, CSF virus is very stable in a protein rich environment and hence in 
organic material. Survival in the abiotic environment seems therefore limited in absence of 
organic matter. However, Ellis et al. (1977) distinguished seasonal peaks of outbreaks in 
the spring and autumn. This could not be explained by larger numbers of pregnant gilts 
and sows in certain periods of the year, but might be associated with climatic conditions 
favouring a higher stability of the virus (Terpstra 1987). 
It is however still unclear what the routes may be. Transmission via excretions seems 
unlikely in the early stages of infection from the experiment by Dewulf and other (2002b). 
Five pairs of pigs were experimentally infected with CSF virus. The pigs were removed 
from their pens when the pigs were viraemic for at least 3 days and 20 hours later 
susceptible pigs were placed in these pens for 35 days. During the whole experiment, the 
temperature in the pens was about 20 ºC and the pens were neither cleaned nor 
disinfected. None of the susceptible pigs became infected. Remarkably, no virus was 
isolated from the excretion samples that were taken in the pens at the moment of 
depopulation and at the moment of restocking. 
 
4.3.2 Airborne  
Aerosol transmission of CSF has been reported for short distances of one meter (Hughes 
and Gustafson 1960, González et al. 2001). This was done by an artificial airflow between 
two pens. In a situation without an artificial airflow, transmission did not occur over a 
distance of 3 ft (Hughes and Gustafson 1960). The virus probably needs the air currents to 
rapidly arrive at the susceptible animals before inactivation. Dewulf et al (2000) also used 
air currents and showed aerosol transmission over short distances inside a farm. One 
infectious pig was sufficient to infect other pigs within the same pen by direct contact, 
whereas seven infectious pigs were needed to transmit the virus towards an adjacent pen 
(Dewulf et al 2000). Laevens et al (1998) found the role of airborne transmission to 
adjacent pens to be far more important for the spread of the virus than the role of 
contaminated clothing or footwear. No research appears to have been done on aerosol 
transmission over longer distances than meters. This indicates that while air-current 
transmission is possible, it is probably not an important method of transmission of CSF 
virus. 
It has been suggested that airborne spread from farm to farm could occasionally occur in 
areas with high pig densities, but that it would not be a major feature of the epidemiology 
(Hughes and Gustafson 1960, Terpstra 1988). Crauwels et al (2003) support this view, as 
they could not find an association between time down wind and infection risk for 
neighbouring farms. ‘Land spreading of liquid manure is unlikely to be a factor in the 
possible airborne spread of CSF virus, especially since only negligible quantities stay 
airborne’ (Terpstra 1987). 
 
4.3.3 Soil and water 
Little research has been done on the transmission of CSF via contaminated soil or water. 
This is probably because the survival outside protein-rich material is considered to be 
limited.  
To test survival of CSF virus in. soil, artificially contaminated red bricks and chopped hay 
were exposed to air (but protected from direct sunlight and rain) Both materials still 
retained infective virus at 7 days but were no longer infective at 14 days (Slavin 1938). It is 
unclear whether the infection of brick and hay with spleen fluids represents any real risk of 
infection. Infectivity was not tested by placing susceptible animals in direct contact with the 
bricks or hay. Instead, the brick and hay were grinded and a filtered suspension was 
injected into a susceptible pig.  
Bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) virus is member of the genus Pestivirus that infects cattle. 





of water varied from 6 till 24 days at 20 ºC (Pagnini et al. 1984). CSF virus was shown to 
persist in foetuses and foetal placenta, meaning that large amounts of virus may be 
disseminated at farrowing (Terpstra 1987).  However, blood and other fluids that are 
excreted are often eaten by the sow, as is the afterbirth (Graves 1984). Thus direct risk 
from these materials may be very limited. 
 
4.3.4 Animal vectors 
Birds have been suggested as possible animal vectors for CSF. Kaden and others (2003) 
inoculated five ravens, one hooded crow and two laying hens orally with 1 ml of CSF virus 
(104.5 TCID50). The hens and birds were kept in a pen with pigs and other pigs were fed 
the faeces of the birds. None of the hens, birds or pigs developed clinical signs during the 
study. CSF virus could neither be detected from the faeces nor from the blood and organs 
of the birds. This may indicate that these species don’t play a role in virus transmission. 
Pigeons and buzzards also do not seem to transmit the CSF virus (Dorset et al. 1919, 
Dawson et al. 1914, Loan and Storm 1968). English sparrow (Passer domesticus) have 
however been shown to transmit the CSF virus from infected to susceptible pigs (Hughes 
and Gustafson 1960). But sparrows don’t develop antibodies against the virus and do not 
transmit the virus to other sparrows (Loan and Strom 1968). This may indicate that they do 
not serve as reservoir hosts for pigs, but probably as mechanical vectors. It could even be 
possible that in the experiment of Hughes and Gustafson (1960) the wind currents caused 
by sparrows promoted aerial transmission. Sparrows flew to and fro the houses of infected 
and susceptible pigs that were connected by a 6 feet (1.8 m) long flyway. The same 
authors had already demonstrated airborne spread of CSF virus by using artificial air 
currents. So birds are at best mechanical vectors, not reservoirs, but it is equally possible 
that their role is of no significance. 
The role of cats, dogs and rats as reservoirs seems to be unlikely (Dewulf et al. 2001). 
Three cats, three dogs and four rats were inoculated orally and intranasally with the 
average amount that an infected pig excretes (103 TCID50/ml). After an observation 
period of 43 days, it was concluded that no or very minimal viral replication had occurred 
in the animals. This is in accordance with the previous studies (Schwarte 1959) rejecting 
the role of birds, rodents, dogs or cats. These animals may not represent significant 
biological reservoirs, but mechanical spread of CSF (i.e. via fur or feathers) remains 
possible. It has not been excluded that these animals transmit the disease by eating 
contaminated meat and excreting it via their faeces. There are however no reports on 
these types of transmission. 
Sheep and goats have been shown to harbour the virus for as long as three weeks 
(reviewed in Hughes and Gustafson 1960). Infected sheep and goats develop antibodies, 
but did not seem to transmit the virus naturally to other sheep of goats (Loan and Storm 
1968). Other species that were found to produce antibodies after experimental inoculation 
with CSF virus (but could not transmit it to animals of the same species in direct contact) 
are deer, peccaries and calves. Additionally, calves did not transmit the virus naturally to 
susceptible pigs in direct contact (Loan and Storm 1968). 
Chenut and others (1999) found that hares and rabbits developed antibodies when a live 
CSF vaccine (C-strain) was administered. Only the rabbits clearly showed clinical signs, 
but they did not transmit the virus to animals of the same species nor did any animal die. 
Sheep were not found to develop antibodies due to the vaccine. The authors also reported 
the absence of clinical signs and antibody formation after oral delivery of C-strain vaccine 
to wild rodents, rats, foxes, goats and crows, but no data was shown. 
Research has been done on the potential of insects to act as animal vector (Tidwell et al. 
1972, Stewart et al. 1975). The biological transmission of CSF virus by mosquitoes (Aedes 
aegypti) could not be confirmed, but mechanical transmission was possible (Stewart et al. 
1975). This means that transmission did not occur due to blood transfusion, but due to 
contact. The virus had persisted for 3 days in the mosquitoes. However transmission 





noteworthy to emphasize that Aedes aegypti was not among these six species. Two 
species of horseflies (Tabanus lineola and Tabanus quinquecittatus) experimentally 
transmitted the virus to susceptible pigs within 2 hours after biting an infected pig. Three 
other Tabanus species were incriminated. An apparent 24 hours delayed transmission of 
the virus by horse flies occurred. There was however some evidence that biological 
transmission did not occur, but that it was mechanical transmission (Tidwell et al. 1972).  
Hughes and Gustafson (1960) found that stable flies (Stomoxys calcitrans) and houseflies 
(Musca domestica) were not capable of transmitting CSF. However, Miller and others 
(1974) isolated CSF virus from houseflies and stable flies up to 72 hours after exposure of 
an infective blood meal. In addition, face flies (Musca autumnalis), which tend to live 
longer that the former two species, harboured large quantities of virus for up to 7 days 
(104.6 PFU/ml). Although biological transmission has never been demonstrated, it is 
conceivable that these Diptera species could occasionally play a role in the mechanical 
transmission, especially where infected and susceptible pigs are in close proximity and the 
flies are in abundance (Terpstra 1987).  
Shope (1958) showed swine lungworms to be a reservoir of CSF virus, but no further 
research seems to have been conducted to assess the risk of transmission under natural 
conditions. Manure worms (Heliodrilus sp.) were not capable of transmitting CSF under 
experimental conditions (Hughes and Gustafson 1960). 
Humans are seen as mechanical vectors. Hunting farmers are often identified as 
transmitters for taking home wild boars and swill feeding the offal to their pigs. 
Contaminated clothing could not significantly contribute to the spread of the virus (Laevens 
et al. 1998). 
 
4.4 Infection dose and route 
Domestic pigs and wild swine seem to be equally susceptible to CSF (Brugh et al. 1964). 
Under experimental conditions, ‘pigs have been infected by oral, nasal, aerogenic, 
conjunctival, genital and various parental routes’ (Terpstra 1987). But pigs are usually 
infected via inhalation. The minimum infection dose via the respiratory route seems to be 
less than 10 TCID50 per pig (Liess 1987, Dahle and Leiss 1995, Dewulf et al. 2001).  
The oral infection route is probably less important, because researchers had great 
difficulty with infecting pigs (Slavin 1938, Hughes and Gustafson 1960). Remarkably, a 
bacterial infection with Salmonella choleraesuis seems to be an important synergistic 
factor in the oral infection with CSF (Hughes and Gustafson 1960). All 10 pigs exposed to 
both virus and bacteria got infected orally, while the virus infected only 2 out of 10 pigs 
without the bacteria. 
The venal infection route appears to be possible through abraded skin (Hughes and 
Gustafson 1960). However, in this experiment, the virus was deliberately applied to the 
abraded skin. It is therefore unclear whether this is an important infection route and what 
the MID might be. 
 
4.4.1 Carrier state 
There are different ways by which pigs can become carriers. The first way is the ‘carrier-
sow syndrome’. This is caused by strains of low virulence (Terpstra 1987, De Smit et al. 
1999). The carrier-sow syndrome implies that the sows are subclinically infected with CSF 
and transmit the virus to the foetuses. The piglets from these sows are born apparently 
healthy, but shed large quantities of virus for 4 to 6 months without showing signs of 
disease of developing an immune response (Meyer et al. 1981). This carrier-state may 
occur in 43% of the pregnant sows in one herd (Terpstra 1987). 
Post-natal infections with strains of low or moderate virulence may also induce a carrier 
state in piglets (Baker and Sheffy 1960). The maternal antibodies give the piglets a 
passive protection that masks the clinical signs. Transient infections have also been seen 





Another way for a carrier state to develop is from vaccination. Normally, vaccinated pigs 
do not transmit the virus to susceptible pigs (Chenut et al. 1999). But when the 
immunization due to the vaccination has not yet established itself or because the vaccine 
is not effective enough, a carrier state may result (Kaden et al. 2001). Swine vaccinated by 
a vaccine of insufficient potency may develop a subclinical infection when exposed to field 
strains, and infected pregnant sows may still transmit the virus via the placenta, despite 
vaccination (Leunen and Strobbe 1977). For example, a recently developed marker 
vaccine did not prevent vertical and horizontal transmission of CSF virus (Dewulf et al. 
2002). It only protected pregnant gilts from the clinical course of the disease, thus a carrier 
state was initiated. Even though it is known that CSF carriers exist and can transmit CSF 
to susceptible animals, the amounts of virus that CSF carriers excrete are still unknown.  
 
4.5 Ranking of transmission routes 
Like FMD, it seems hardly possible to prevent primary outbreaks from occurring. Primary 
outbreaks originate from swill feeding infected meat or introduction of animals from an 
infected region, before CSF was noticed, or illegal transport. The transmission of CSF 
virus is considered to be mainly by direct contact with infected pigs and contaminated 
meat. For example, all three primary outbreaks in 1986 in Great Britain were attributed to 
the feeding of unprocessed waste food containing imported pigs meat products. Further 
spread was attributed to markets where infected pigs were traded and mechanical transfer 
also occurred (Williams and Matthews 1988). Thus long distance spread of CSF was 
commonly assigned to human practices. 
It is difficult to treat CSF-infected meat in such a way that it renders the material non-
infective. In its guidelines for the treatment of CSF-infected meat, OIE prescribes lengthy 
heat treatment or natural fermentation processes of considerable length (OIE, 2004, 
Terrestrial Code, appendix 3.6.4). So, the only way to prevent this transmission route is to 
prohibit swill feeding and effectively enforce this prohibition. 
In areas of high pig density, the situation may be different. For example, during the 
epidemic in the Netherlands 1997-1998, radial dispersion of CSF virus seemed more 
important in neighbourhood infection (within a radius of 1km) than dispersion along the 
road on which the infection source is situated (Crauwels et al. 2003). This implies that 
airborne transmission or transmission via animal vectors like pets, rodents, birds or insects 
were more important than transmission via, for example unknown or unreported social 
contacts between neighbours, which the authors had expected to be more associated with 
dispersion along the road. From the references reviewed in this report, transmission by 
animals as mechanical vectors seems possible and specific meteorological conditions 
allow for airborne spread. But during the epidemic there was no association found 
between time downwind and infection risk for neighbouring farms. Transmission by animal 
vectors seems therefore to be most likely route, although airborne spread cannot be 
excluded as possible contributing factor. No specific animal species were proposed to 
have caused the neighbourhood spread of CSF. The transmission distance was however 
limited within a radius of only 500m (Crauwels et al. 2003). Staubach and others (1997) 
found the same radius. Roberts (1995) found that in high pig density areas CSF 
transmission is usually limited to neighbouring herds within a 6 km radius. In the epizootics 
he referred to, the major modes of long distance transmission were movement of animals, 
equipment or staff (contact spread) and possibly airborne spread.  
It seems likely, that animal vectors can play a role in short distance transmission. 
Mechanical transmission of CSF virus in clothing, feathers or fur may be unlikely for long-
distance transmission, because the conditions (i.e. temperature and low protein content) 
may be unfavourable for virus survival. Transmission via faeces of cats, dogs and rats 
(after these animals have eaten contaminated pig’s meat) depends on the virus survival in 
the digestive tract. Swine occasionally eat faeces, but the amounts are unknown. There 





The rest of the transmission routes cannot conclusively be placed in a ranking of 
importance. Congenital transmission and sexual transmission take place, but it cannot be 
assessed how much they contribute to the spread. Airborne transmission seems to only 
occur over short distances. Information about the survival of CSF virus in the abiotic 
environment is lacking, but is presumed to be low when the protein content is low.  
 
4.6 Interface of domestic and wild animals 
Direct contact, infected meat (i.e. dead bodies) and over short distances animal vectors 
seem to be important routes for the transmission of CSF virus. By knowing this, it may be 
possible to assess the transmission risk when either wild boars or domestic pigs are the 
source of infection. Wild boar populations can constitute a source of CSF virus. Direct 
contact between wild boars and hogs kept outside is possible in some regions, but only is 
a risk if the boar population harbours CSF. Furthermore, when measures are taken to 
prevent direct contact between wild boars and domestic pigs by spatial separation, the 
transmission risk seems minimal, because long distance transmission of CSF virus seems 
to be limited. Airborne spread has its limitations and so has CSF survival outside the 
host’s body. 
Feeding contaminated meat of wild boars to domestic hogs is the most frequent source of 
primary outbreaks in regions with CSF endemic in wild boar populations. Farmer/ hunters 
fed parts of the animals they shot to there livestock. Domestic pigs that die before 
slaughter are commonly disposed of by incineration, but sometimes illegally by burying 
them on the spot. Although the situation may differ in Eastern Europe, as there are more 
smallholder farms and state surveillance is less tight. Fortunately, rules have been 
implemented prohibiting swill feeding entirely or demanding decontamination by 
thoroughly heating the meat before feeding (Ferrari et al. 199, Laddomada et al. 1994, 
Fritzemeier et al. 2000). 
‘Transmission to domestic pigs from infected wild boars has never convincingly 
been proven to occur by aerosol or by contaminated natural products, like earth 
and grass’ (Artois et al. 2002).  
Taking into account the lack of data on the survival of CSF virus outside its host, it is still 
possible to discuss the risk domestic pigs and wild boars pose to each other by different 
animal vectors. Contaminated flies, rats and pets seem more likely to originate from 
domestic animals, rather than from wildlife, as the density of infectious particles is higher 
and these animals, including stray cats and dogs, commonly live close to humans. Stray 
cats are more likely to come into contact with infected pigs than birds or stray dogs. They 
are tolerated in stables, as they can help a farmer with rodent problems. However, stray 
cats are sometimes seen as a pest, just as stray dogs (common in Eastern Europe). 
Eating meat offal or carcasses of wild boars may contaminate these animals. The question 
remains how infective these carcasses and their faeces are and what the probability is that 
susceptible swine have access to these animal or their faeces.  
Another factor that has to be mentioned in light of direct contact between wild boar and 
domestic pigs is that wild boars infected with CSF virus may exhibit altered behaviours, 
such as loss of natural shyness, approaching or even entering farm buildings, or leaving 
the forests during daylight (Loepelmann and Dedek 1987, Artois et al. 2001).  
In conclusion, it seems that the probability of CSF virus transmission is higher when 
domestic pigs are the infection source than when wild boars are the infection source. Yet, 
wild boars are a possible infection source as long as there are wild boar populations 
persistently infected with CSF.  
There are a few reports on the transmission of CSF from domestic to wild boars. For 
example, in the north of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (spring 1993) there were two 
outbreaks in domestic pigs and it was speculated that these were the source for an 
infection in wild boar (end of 1992, Fritzemeier et al. 2000). This virus type spread among 
the population and kept circulating in the wild boar population. Reinfection of domestic 





interest for CSF in wild boar before the eradication program started of CSF in the 80s. The 
interest for the CSF in wild boar emerged after the eradication in domestic hogs was 
successful and wild boar populations appeared to be a risk factors for re-emergence of 
this economically devastating disease. 
The CSF outbreaks in pig farms in Tuscany (Ferrari et al. 1991), in Sardinia (Laddomada 
et al. 1994) and in Germany (Fritzemeier et al. 2000) have been linked to contact with wild 
boars. In Germany, 59% of the primary outbreaks in the period 1991-1998 in domestic pig 
herds were due to direct or indirect contact to infected wild boar and wild boar meat, 
whereas 23% of the primary outbreaks were due to the (illegal) swill feeding of 
contaminated meat from abroad. The source of the infection of the remaining 18% could 
not be determined (Fritzemeier et al. 2000). Fortunately, the domestic pig herd density is 
small in the German regions that have infected wild boar population. The risk of large 
epidemic may therefore be small. No transmission was reported from wild boar to 
domestic pig in the epidemic of 1998 in Switzerland. This was probably due to the low 
density of pig farms in rough terrain (Schnyder et al. 2002).  
 
4.6.1 Persistence in wildlife 
CSF has been shown to persist in wild boar populations. It is still endemic in wild boar 
populations in regions of Germany, and in most cases does not seem to be self-limiting 
(Fritzemeier et al. 2000). In Sardinia, it has been endemic for at least 15 years and the 
transmission from wild boar to wild boar seems to play an important role in the spread and 
persistence of classical swine fever (Artois, 2002, Laddomada et al. 1994).  
For CSF to be endemic, the basic reproduction rate of CSF must be approximate 1 
(Ro≈1), yet not fall below 1, lest the infection will fade out. For an epidemic, the 
reproduction rate has to be far greater than 1 (Ro>1). Persistence seems to partly depend 
on the virulence of the CSF strain. A highly virulent strain causes high mortality and 
pregnant sows tend to abort, thus recruitment is primarily via immigration. The epizootic 
will die-out when the recruitment is lower than the mortality rate, because the basic 
reproduction rate of CSF decreases as the number of available hosts decreases (Ro<1). 
This was apparent from the epidemic in Switzerland in 1998, which was self-limiting 
(Schnyder et al. 2002). Key elements for this were the high virulence of the virus strain, 
which resulted in a drastic reduction of the population of wild boar and the establishment 
of a high level of herd immunity. The presence of physical barriers at the borders of the 
risk zone also helped to reduce the prevalence of CSF in the wild boar population by 
limiting immigration.  
Mild virulent virus strains will decrease these population-reducing factors. Regularly, the 
mortality is considerably lower and there are more carriers in the population. The ratio 
between immune pigs and carriers presumably depends on the specific virus strain. 
Recruitment would for a part be in the form of chronically and persistently infected piglets, 
due to the ‘carrier-sow syndrome’. These aspects are responsible for maintaining the 
infection, especially in medium to large size herds (Terpstra 1988). 
Infected carcasses may also present an infection source that contributes to the 
persistence of CSF in a wild boar population. The risk from this source also depends on 
the virus strain, as the amount of dead animals depends on the mortality rate. In addition, 
it also depends on the climate. Carcasses especially pose a risk in the event of an 
epidemic in winter. Frozen carcasses can harbour the virus for months or even years. For 
example, the epidemic may have died-out during the winter as a lot of animals die from 
disease, starvation or otherwise. Reinfection can occur in due to exposure to infected 
carcasses that were buried under snow. The infection risk however diminishes after 
defrosting, as the virus will presumably inactivate in a few days or weeks. ‘CSF virus may 
be more persistent in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe due to the climatic 






Other factors that seem to play a crucial role in the shift from an epizootic to a persistent 
endemic situation are the size of the affected population, the density and the age structure 
(Artois et al. 2002). The larger the population size, the higher the density and the younger 
the age structure, the greater the chances of virus persistence.  
A young age structure causes the immunity to be very low in the population as older 
animals may have immunity from previous outbreaks. A large portion of young pigs is a 
passively protected against the clinical signs due to maternal antibodies or they are 
persistently infected via the carrier-sow syndrome. This means that a large portion of the 
population will consist of carriers during an outbreak, when the age structure is young. 
Young boars can disperse the virus over long distances, as they leave the family group. 
From model studies, the most conservative (= lowest) estimation of the density required 
for a CSF infection to fade-out would have to be about 200 susceptible animals in an area 
of approximately 220 km2 (0.9 animals/km2) or lower. This threshold density has also 
been stated in disease control programs for CSF (Artois et al. 2002). This density was in 
correspondence with the situation in Switzerland (Schnyder et al. 2002). Estimation of the 
threshold density depends on the method and assumptions employed. It also depends on 
various factors like climate and geography. For example, from models it is has been 
assessed that the threshold was 6.4 wild boar/km2 for an area in Pakistan and 0.6 -1.1 
wild boar/km2 in Eastern Sardinia (Artois et al, 2002, Schnyder et al. 2002).  
The persistence of CSF in wildlife depends on various factors, including the rate of 
transmission in the population considered. The danger of persistent CSF in wild boars is 
that it can spread from one area to another due to transmission among wild boars. It is 
however unclear at what rate dissemination from one area to another will take place. It 
seemed to take years before CSF had spread from one province unit to another unit in the 
province Nuoro, Sardinia (Laddomada et al. 1994). In the epidemic of 1998 in Switzerland 
only one wild boar was found that had contracted the infection within the infected zone and 
migrated into the non-infected zone. During this epidemic, CSF had never spread to the 
non-infected zone (Schnyder et al. 2002).  
Artois and others (2002) state that the CSF virus does not appear to spread easily in 
natural populations of free-living wild boars. This low transmission rate is probably due to 
the ecology of wild boar, but can also depend situation-specific conditions, such as the 
degree of habitat fragmentation and the type of habitat. The rate of CSF transmission is 
presumed to be lower when the habitat is rough, impervious and fragmented, because the 
chance that wild boars meet is lower. 
Wild boars live in social groups and the movements of these groups are commonly 
restricted to a home range. This home range is however not defended as a real territory 
(Graves 1984). Wild boar groups do not leave their home range as long as they are not 
disturbed. Groups usually consist of a sow and her piglets (Graves 1984). The larger 
groups are each led by a sow (the guiding sow. It is further composed of other sows, the 
piglets and maybe a few young males. Family groups do not fall apart until either the 
young are sexually mature (7 to 8 months) or a sow is ready to farrow again (Graves 
1984). Males start living relatively solitary from an age 1 to 2 years. These adult or 
subadult males usually join female groups during the mating season (November and 
December) after which the piglets are born in March and April. Males have a larger home 
range than females (Graves 1984).  
The entire distribution area is subdivided in home ranges for herds or individuals. Each 
has his own undefended territory. These home ranges border each other and there is 
contact between groups that have a family relationship. It is important not to disturb the 
social order (pers. comm. M. Montizaan), because it promotes long distance transmission 
of CSF. During periods of food scarcity or intense hunting, wild boars can cross a distance 
of more than 15 kilometres, while looking for a new habitat (Baubet et al. 1998). Different 
methods of hunting can have different impacts of the dispersal of wild boars. 
In conclusion, the persistence of CSF in a wild boar population can be promoted by a mild 





cold climate. The transmission rate of CSF in a large area depends among other things on 
the ecology of wild boars. The rate of transmission can be low in wild boar populations, 
because the movement of wild boar groups is restricted to a home range, as long as the 
social order is not disturbed. 
 
4.7 CSF policy  
At the beginning of the 21st century, CSF remains widespread in parts of the globe, such 
as in South America and Asia. Successful eradication has been achieved in many 
countries, including North America, Australasia, and parts of Northern Europe and many 
countries have successfully maintained a disease-free status in the absence of vaccination 
with totally susceptible swine populations. Yet, complete eradication is still out of reach in 
parts of Europe (Edwards et al. 2000). There are a few regions where CSF persists in wild 
boars (for example, the French-German border area and probably in Poland, pers. comm. 
E.G.M. van Klink). 
The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code distinguishes between a CSF-free status with or 
without CSF in wild pigs: 
 
Article 2.6.7.5. 
Country or zone free of CSF in domestic pigs but with infection in the wild pig 
population 
Requirements in point 2.6.7.4.2. of Article 2.6.7.4., as relevant, are complied 
with, but CSF infection is known to occur in wild pigs. Additional conditions for 
the free status are that in the country or zone: 
• a programme for the management of CSF in wild pigs is in place, and 
CSF wild pig control areas are delineated around every CSF case 
reported in wild pigs, taking into account the measures in place to 
manage the disease in the wild pig population, the presence of natural 
boundaries, the ecology of the wild pig population, and an assessment of 
the risk of disease spread; 
• biosecurity measures are applied to prevent transmission from wild pigs 
to domestic pigs; 
• clinical and laboratory monitoring (under study) is carried out in the 
domestic pig population, with negative results. 
 
EU control programmes may include monitoring boar populations, oral vaccination and 
further restrictions in case of an outbreak (European Commission, 1999). 
From 1990 onwards, no regular vaccination against CSF has been performed in the 
European Union (Vandeputte and Chappuis 1999). This also applies to the new countries 
after accession, as the eradication programs of all the countries of the EU have been 
harmonized. In principle, all EU countries have the same policy (pers. comm. E.G.M. van 
Klink). In the rest of Central and Eastern Europe vaccination is still performed. Stamping-
out alone or combined with vaccination is used in response to a CSF outbreak in all of 
these countries. The epidemiological CSF situation in wild boar is unknown for the majority 
of the countries of Eastern Europe (Edwards et al. 2000). In Sardinia the strategy is to let 
CSF run its course in wild boar, but at least 14 years later, it is still enzootic (Laddomada 
et al. 1994, Artois et al. 2002). 
 
4.71 Prevention 
As mentioned before, there is a lot of uncertainty about transmission routes. Prevention 
could be more accurate, if the mechanisms behind neighbourhood infections were better 
understood. As to wild boar, there is still a lot of data lacking about CSF status, spread 
and persistence. Where monitoring programmes are at work, wild boars are regularly 
monitored for the presence of CSF, by (randomly) checking the blood or wild boars that 





Pre-emptive depopulation is a legal possibility in the Netherlands. This policy however is 
not considered to be effective. This is mainly caused by the high recruitment of wild boars. 
The wild boar populations have experienced explosive growth in recent years, due to rich 
mast years (Damhuis et al. 2004). 
Farmers can do much to prevent CSF infection from wild boars  
‘An important factor for virus transmission from wild boar to domestic pigs is 
mismanagement in the pig holdings themselves, i.e. lacking hygienic measures 
(contaminated equipment and clothing), false handling of wild boar carcasses (swill 
feeding) and lack of protection against contact with infected wild boar’ (Fritzemeier 
et al. 2000). 
Farmers need to take responsibility in protecting their livestock. Therefore, good farming 
practices need to be encouraged. Isolating domestic stock from wild boar in regions with 
Although ecologists and nature conservationists generally don’t favour eradication of CSF, 
OIE guidelines as well as EU economic policy in the long run aim at the highest CSF-free 
status, including a CSF free status of wild animals.  
 
4.7.2 Control  
Although emergency vaccination can slow the transmission, stamping out is generally 
preferred. Main reason is that vaccinated animals cannot be distinguished from infected 
ones. Another important reason is that vaccinated sows tend to produce carrier piglets, 
which pass unnoticed. Recently emergency vaccination for CSF has been allowed for 
domestic pigs under certain circumstances (pers. comm. E.G.M. van Klink). Unfortunately, 
there is still the problem of discriminating between pigs that are vaccinated and 
subsequently infected and pigs that are vaccinated but not infected. Furthermore, there is 
the risk that vaccinated pigs, as carriers, still transmit the disease. A marker vaccine that 
has been developed for CSF does not seem to prevent horizontal and/or vertical 
transmission (Depner et al. 2001, Uttenthal et al. 2001, Dewulf et al. 2002).  
At the moment, there are marker vaccines available, that can considerably limit the spread 
of epidemics and thus prevent unnecessary killing of millions of healthy animals. The 
problem of carrier animals can be circumvented by not vaccinating the sows. Thus, most 
animals will be immunized and Ro will fall below 1 and stop the epidemic. The 
unvaccinated animals, i.e. the sows and the very young piglets will function as indicator 
animals and develop symptoms, should a carrier animal be present in the herd 
(Klinkenberg, 2003). 
Yet the very reasons, as mentioned in the previous chapter on FMD, to prefer stamping 
out over emergency vaccination and keep the vaccinated animals alive, also apply to CSF. 
In theory, use of a marker vaccine allows trading of slaughtered vaccinated animals. But 
unless there is an OIE approved protocol declaring such practices safe, disease-free 
countries will probably not accept such meat. At the moment, ring vaccination and 
subsequent culling is probably the best option.  
A persistent preference for stamping out bodes ill for wild boar, should they become 
infected in an intensive pig farming region. In the 80s there was an outbreak of CSF under 
domestic swine in the Netherlands. The epidemic spread to the wild boar population in the 
enclosed National Park ‘de Hoge Veluwe’, in the Netherlands. It was decided to shoot all 
wild boars in the National Park. CSF was successfully eradicated, but the total 
extermination of the wild boar population could not be achieved. A few wild boars survived 
and repopulated the enclosed area (pers. comm. M. Montizaan). Fortunately the outbreak 
of 1997-1998 in the Netherlands, did not reach the wild boar populations (Bernard et al. 
1999, Dekker and Elbers 2000, Crauwels et al. 2003).  
Depopulation by hunting is a regular method in wild boar population that is infected with 
CSF. This however tends to remove recovered immune individuals and to favour 
compensatory reproduction and immigration (Laddomada 2000, Damhuis et al. 2004). 
This will increase the proportion of non-exposed susceptible individuals as well as carriers 





stopped as soon as a CSF outbreak is detected. In the absence of culling, infected 
animals die from the infection or seroconvert, and the number of susceptible animals is 
more likely to decrease below the threshold density required for persistence. In this 
situation, a high proportion of the population will be composed of immunized animals and 
the probability of contact between susceptible and infectious animals shedding the virus 
will be low. ‘Thus without hunting, the CSF would be expected to die out within a year or 
two’ (Artois et al. 2001). This is only the case when the virus strain is highly virulent and 
the conditions allow a high transmission rate. Otherwise the basic reproduction rate of 
CSF may stabilize above 1, like in Eastern Sardinia, where CSF has remained endemic for 
at least 15 years without intervention by humans. 
In some areas with endemic CSF in wild boar populations (e.g. Eastern Germany), it is 
common practice to establish feeding places for wild boars during winter, to make 
depopulation easier and to decrease the direct hunting disturbance. Supplementary 
feeding however unnaturally increases the population density and can cause high 
concentrations of wild boar in areas with artificial feeding places. Depopulation by hunting 
may thus promote the transmission risk among wild boars and help CSF to prevail. 
It is possible to control a CSF epidemic in wild boar by other means. There have been 
various attempts to develop a method to effectively vaccinate wild boars. For example, 
aerosol vaccination against CSF has been tried but did not seem to induce an immune 
response (Beard and Easterday 1964). On the other hand, oral administration of vaccine 
by burying bait has been shown to immunize wild boar against CSF and be safe for 
rabbits, hares and sheep that may accidentally come across it in the wild (Chenut et al 
1999). Unfortunately, in the evaluation of the first field study in Germany there appeared to 
be a bottleneck, as more than 50% of the young boars did not feed on the vaccine baits 
nor became immunized (Kaden et al. 2000). Fortunately, the rest of the wild boar 
population could be immunized properly, as 72% of the animals that ate the bait were 
serologically positive after the first vaccination campaign. To obtain a higher 
seroprevalence in the younger age group, it may be necessary to enlarge feeding places 
and to reduce the size of the baits. Another way to improve the immunity in young boars 
could be by summer immunization when maternal antibody titres are low or absent (Kaden 
et al. 1999).  
Kaden and others (2000) have successfully eradicated CSF in wild boar population from 
the infected area in Lower Saxony by oral vaccination. Likely contributory factors for the 
eradication of CSF were a moderate wild boar density, low infection pressure and proper 
application of oral immunization In contrast, the eradication of CSF in wild boar 
populations of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and of Brandenburg using oral 
immunization was not possible within four years. In these immunization areas, the density 
of wild boar population is higher and the environmental conditions are also very different 
(Kaden et al. 2000). The pitfall in oral immunization is that the vaccination of an insufficient 
number (or proportion) of animals will not only lead to a failure of the eradication program 
but may even allow CSF to become endemic, because it does not prevent the spread of 
wild-type virus (Artois et al. 2001, Van Campen et al. 2001). The effectiveness of oral 
vaccination is therefore situation-specific and may not be applicable in areas where the 
bait is difficult to spread (e.g. mountain, large nature reserves). 
A risk with emergency vaccination could be that pigs develop a persistent CSF infection. 
Kaden and others (2001) researched this risk for oral vaccination of wild boars or pigs in 
an infected area. Pigs that are vaccinated and infected simultaneously show a transient 
viraemia and shedding of virus for some days after which the animals die. Notably, pigs 
that were vaccinated orally and infected with a virus of low virulence at the same time can 
transiently shed virus and become immune. No virus could be found in any part of these 






4.7.3 Best policy for wildlife 
There are strong arguments in favour of non-intervention, should a CSF outbreak occur in 
wild boar. It would keep CSF’s ecological function intact and there is a good chance that 
the disease will fade out all by itself. Non-intervention will also prevent the disease from 
spreading to other wild boar populations. For practical purposes, it may even be the only 
alternative in many areas, covering a large surface and pretty rough terrain. On the other 
hand, wild boar may become a reservoir of CSF for a considerable length of time, testing 
tolerance of agricultural interest groups towards wild boar populations. Even so, in 
intensive pig farming area, the risk of wild boar to domestic pigs is minimal, since intensive 
farms are thoroughly isolated from wild boar. Endemic CSF is a risk, where domestic 
swine are kept outside and where sensible precautions are not taken. Yet there is no such 
a thing as 100% intensive or a 100% extensive pig farming area. Nowadays, industrial 
systems co-exist with organic farms, with pigs roaming outside. So the domestic-wildlife 
interface is never entirely without risk. Prevention of direct contact is always at the order, 
especially as wildlife in general has more to fear from domestic outbreaks than vice versa. 
Current practice  in the  EU of monitoring wild boar and  taking measures, involving strict 
isolation have proven adequate in preventing CSF transmission from wild boar to domestic 
pigs. Educating farmers and enforcing the ban on feeding swill or boar offal to domestic 
pigs may still need more effort. 
The risk of transmission from wild boars to domestic pigs is minimal when direct contact 
and illegal swill feeding or feeding of wild boar carcasses are not practised. It is necessary 
to protect domestic pigs, e.g. by fencing around the farmyard and by good management in 
pig holdings. Yet, given the gaps in knowledge of transmission mechanisms and the 
difficulty to keep swine (domestic as well as wild ones) on the proper side of the fence 
where domestic pigs are free-roaming, it may sometimes be desirable to eradicate CSF in 
a wild boar population, if feasible. Vaccination campaigns will be the first choice. It should 
be set up in such a way to favour vaccination of the young ones. Animals should be 
disturbed as little as possible (no hunting) and confined to the area, isolating them from 









• The objective of this study is to explore alternative prevention and control 
strategies that better serve nature conservation, in view of the transmission risk of 
infectious animal diseases between wildlife and livestock. This is a relatively new 
issue, because the European nature policy, aiming at a Europe-wide network of 
interconnected nature reserves is still far from realisation. Recent outbreaks of 
CSF, FMD and fowl pest have launched a public debate about mass destruction of 
animals, serving primarily trade interests. The 2001 OIE/ FAO conference on FMD 
recommended member states to include provisions to protect endangered species, 
in particular those covered by the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species. OIE’s own contribution would be to allow vaccination of 
endangered species, without losing the FMD-free status, under condition that such 
animals are individually identified and kept in a location where physical barriers 
and zoosanitary procedures effectively prevent direct or indirect contact with 
pathogens. Another provision OIE would consider, was compartmentalisation (OIE/ 
FAO, 2001). Also OIE’s periodical Scientific and Technical Review published a 
special issue on the wildlife/ livestock interface in 2002.  
• On initiative of OIE, the EU organized in 2004 a multistakeholder conference on 
animal welfare. The wildlife issue was briefly addressed and yielded three 
recommendations: 1) that OIE should work with relevant stakeholders on the 
subject of animal welfare standards for wildlife 2) that OIE should take into 
consideration endangered animal species when developing animal welfare 
standards 3) that OIE should provide guidance for the welfare of endangered 
species and exotic species in captivity. As for killing for disease control purposes, it 
was recommended to have species and disease specific plans and to consider 
wildlife or other disease reservoirs (European Commission, 2004). OIE has 
abandoned its former classification into list A, list B etc disease, with basic 
guidelines according to the list classification. There is only one list now, and 
guidelines are specific per disease. The current guidelines include zoning within a 
country and provisions for protective vaccination of endangered species. The EU 
directive has similar provisions in its new FMD directive. 
• Although this has laid a more favourable ground for further work in this area, it is 
only the beginning. Nature conservation as an issue in its own right has not been 
acknowledged, nor de-domesticated species that are increasingly employed in 
nature management and restoration. As of yet, there is little room for improvement 
for wild populations, and none at all for domestic animals employed in nature 
management. The EU Habitat Directive (92/43/EEC) contains articles permitting 
exemption from the obligations under this directive, for example Article 16. 
Protection of listed species can be overruled in order to prevent serious damage to 
crops and livestock, or for other reasons of overriding public interest, including 
those of a social or economic nature. As the Habitat Directive offers no protected 
status to herbivores in a process of de-domestication, the position of these animals 
is even weaker. 
• There is no compelling reason for not including valuable non-production animals in 
the OIE or EU rules allowing for protective vaccination, as long as these animals 
don’t enter the food chain and don’t form an infection risk. Such animals include 
pets, traditional breeds on recreation sites or animals kept for sport or hobby, as 





domestic animals graze in nature reserves and are slaughtered for meat. This 
would be an argument to treat them as production animals. But if they are not, they 
should not be treated as such. 
• It would be undesirable to narrow down a discussion on animal health and wildlife 
to ‘welfare’ and ‘preservation of endangered species’. Animal welfare is, however, 
a most important issue. Current OIE animal welfare principles emphasize welfare 
of individual animals (OIE 2004bis). Yet, from an ecological point of view which is 
also stressed by conservationists, the individual perspective is not appropriate (cf 
chapter 2). In this study we have reviewed FMD and CSF. FMD has been 
implicated as the single most important constraint for trade in live animals and 
animal products, as well as the disease most feared in regions rich in modern, 
industrial animal production farms (Kitching, 2002). Given the importance of hogs 
in industrial production systems, CSF is also a good example of trade-
anxiousness. Other former List A diseases (as well as some List B diseases) 
qualify for that reputation too, for example avian influenza, which has also zoonotic 
potential. During the epidemic of 2003 in the Netherlands, hundreds of thousands 
of production chickens and other poultry were exterminated, as well as thousands 
of pet-chickens and other privately kept birds, whereas little could be done about 
the possible transmission via wild birds. During this epidemic, a veterinarian died 
from infection with the avian influenza virus due to insufficient antiviral medication 
(Dutch government, 2003). Pigs are seen as the main intermittent for new human 
influenza strains (Wells et al. 1991, Rimmelzwaan et al. 2001) and it might be 
possible for avian influenza to develop into a serious public health threat due to 
multiple replication cycles in pigs and wild boars.  
• Neither for FMD, nor for CSF wildlife constitutes a major threat to livestock. With 
only a few exceptions, eradication of FMD and CSF will cause endemic infection in 
wild populations to fade out. The risk of farm animals to wild populations is far 
greater. The conservationists‘preferences for large self-sustaining populations, 
where endemic infectious diseases can freely run their course, are hardly realistic. 
There is no going back to extensive traditional farming, where outbreaks of highly 
contagious diseases like FMD and CSF would spread much slower than is 
currently the case. If wildlife populations and their home ranges are increased, 
which is a goal in nature policy, the risk from infected wild populations to livestock 
might increase as well. Non-eradication might be feasible for other diseases. If 
research turns out that this is indeed the case, non-eradication would be 
preferable. But a non-intervention policy for wildlife during an outbreak is not 
necessarily at odds with a long-term eradication strategy. Contingency plans for 
these diseases should take all possible precautions in order to prevent infection of 
wildlife or semi-wild populations. Local contingency plans for nature reserves to 
minimize transmission risk in either direction might be a good idea. In case a 
population becomes infected, preventive measures against infection of livestock 
from wildlife are often more feasible than mass vaccination or stamping out wildlife. 
Objections against vaccination, based on the ecological role of the disease should 
be re-examined in the light of the desirability of eradication. If there are vaccines 
and non-disturbing vaccination methods for wildlife available, applying them might 
be preferable over non-intervention, if it helps to eradicate a disease faster.  
• Our evaluation of FMD and CSF indicates that there is room for a more nature-
friendly approach. It also shows that there are still important knowledge gaps that 
need to be addressed. Especially the applicability of results found in domestic 
animals to wild species in a natural situation makes tailor-made protocols to better 
protect wildlife problematic. Stamping out wildlife during an outbreak is probably 
unnecessary in most situations. FMD has never become endemic, but CSF has. 
Yet, even where CSF is endemic, monitoring and adequate farm hygiene suffice to 





• An important obstacle to really implement protective vaccination, especially in 
animal-dense regions, is the length of the period before re-establishment of a 
disease-free status in a zone where vaccinated animals are kept alive. The 
difference in economic damage between stamping out and protective vaccination 
has decreased after the 2001 FMD epidemic, but has it decreased enough? 
• New vaccines and better diagnostic techniques might give rise to more precisely 
targeted protocols involving vaccination as a control or prevention strategy. Animal 
products from vaccinated disease-free regions, if produced in conditions set out by 
OIE are safe for trade and consumption. Also, meat from animals vaccinated 
against CSF is only a risk when fed to pigs. As animal products, when fed to 
livestock, may pose a risk for many diseases, it would probably be helpful if OIE 
set out generic guidelines for the use of animal products in animal feed. Main trade 
restrictions for veterinary reasons concern the trade in live animals. Given the 
frequency of outbreaks of listed diseases, it might be desirable to generally restrict 
trade and transport of live animals in both vaccinated and non-vaccinated disease-
free zones. It might be useful to examine the justification for trade barriers in the 
light of the current state of affairs and to take also into account other 
developments, such as the enormously increased trade and tourism volume. 
Unjustified trade restrictions are against WTO rules and WTO might do well to 
more closely examine the veterinary restrictions. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
• It is recommended to extend the category of animals qualifying for protective 
vaccination to other non-production animals. Future guidelines should offer better 
protection to valuable animals in general, not only wildlife and zoo animals, but 
also breeding stock, and animals kept as pets, or for recreational purposes. There 
is a need to develop authoritative guidelines and protocols that take nature and 
wildlife into account. Given the OIE’s willingness to play a leading role in this 
respect, LHF is advised to achieve consultative status with OIE.  
• Since it is the EU’s own nature policy that suffers from veterinary regulations 
without regard for wildlife, ecological infrastructure and de-domesticated species, 
LHF needs to lobby the EU as well. Apart from WWF, with which LHF has already 
close ties, there are wider NGO umbrella’s, for example European Environmental 
Bureau (www.eeb.org) that could be helpful in this respect 
• Research into practical implementation of the ecological infrastructure is needed, 
allowing for appropriate measures, like compartmentalisation in case of an 
outbreak 
• To ensure implementation of nature-friendly guidelines, it is important to find ways 
of reducing infection risks, without compromising the disease-free status more than 
with a stamping out policy. 
• Knowledge gaps as to transmission routes for priority diseases need to be 
addressed, especially with respect to the wildlife/ livestock interface 
• More research into animal welfare ethics in relation to wildlife, including 
populations in various stages of de-domestication is urgently needed 
• Given the importance of non-intervention in wild populations in case of an 
outbreak, it is recommended that decisions to eradicate a disease from the region, 
or decisions for interventions in wildlife will allow participation of ecologists and 
nature conservation NGOs. 
• It is recommended to re-examine justification of veterinary trade barriers with 
respect to WTO rules against protectionism 
• It is recommended that nature conservation organizations support the EU’s and 
OIE’s long-term goal of eradication of FMD, despite the fact that it is an endemic 





too vulnerable for diseases as contagious as FMD. Perhaps it is possible to 
maintain the ecological role of CSF to regulate boar density in large nature 
reserves, provided that the wild boar can be effectively isolated from domestic pigs. 
A precondition is, that in case of an outbreak corridors have to be closed off 
completely.  
• In general, isolation of wildlife from domestic animals is important, given the 
transmission risk of infectious animal diseases, including non-endemic diseases 
like African Swine fever to wild populations from domestic livestock. 
 
5.3. Concluding remarks 
Current veterinary rules are quite insensitive to nature restoration and conservation policy. 
Wildlife, for a long time only taken into account as a risk factor only, is now more and more 
seen as a responsibility, but at the moment still in a narrow and limited way. If OIE 
acknowledges the responsibility to help preserve endangered and valuable species, it is 
not too far-fetched to expect responsibility and support to nature conservation as an issue 
in its own right. This study shows, that even for the most fearsome of diseases, FMD and 
to a lesser extent CSF, there is probably room for a prevention and control policy that is 
less restrictive to wildlife. Conservationists and veterinary authorities should exchange 






Aidaros H.A. 2002. Regional status and approaches to control and eradication of foot and mouth 
disease in the Middle East and North Africa. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 451-
458 
Alexandersen A. Brotherhood I. Donaldson A.I. 2002. Natural aerosol transmission of foot-and-
mouth disease virus to pigs: minimal infectious dose for strain O1 Lausanne. Epidemiology and 
Infection. Vol. 128 Page 301-312 
Alexandersen S. and Donaldson A.I. 2002. Further studies to quantify the dose of natural aerosols 
of foot-and-mouth disease virus for pigs. Epidemiology of Infection. Vol. 128 Page 313-323 
Alexandersen S., Zhang Z., Donaldson A.I., Garland A.J.M. 2003. Review: The Pathogenesis and 
diagnosis of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Journal of Comparative Pathology. Vol. 129 Page 1-36 
Amass S.F., Pacheco J.M., Mason P.W., Schneider J.L., Alvarez R.M., Clark L.K., Ragland D. 
2003. Procedures for preventing the transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus to pigs and 
sheep by personnel in contact with infected pigs. Veterinary record. Vol. 153 Page 137-140 
Artois M., Delahay R., Guberti V., Cheeseman C. 2001. Control of infectious diseases of wildlife in 
Europe. The Veterinary Journal. Vol. 162 Page 141-152 
Artois M., Depner K.R., Guberti V., Hars J., Rossi S., Rutili D. 2002. Classical swine fever (hog 
cholera) in wild boar in Europe. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 287-303 
Bachrach et al. 1957 in Alexandersen S., Zhang Z., Donaldson A.I., Garland A.J.M. 2003. Review: 
The Pathogenesis and diagnosis of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Journal of Comparatibe 
Pathology. Vol. 129 Page 1-36 
Baker and Sheffy 1960 in Terpstra C. 1987. Epizootiology of swine fever. The Veterinary Quarterly. 
Vol. 9 Supplement 1 Page 50S-60S 
Ballenger L. 2001. Rattus norvegicus (On-line), Animal Diversity Web. Accessed August 25, 2004 
at http://animaldiversity.ummz.umich.edu/site/accounts/information/Rattus_norvegicus.html. 
Barnett P.V. and Cox S.J. 1999. The role of small ruminants in the epidemiology and transmission 
of foot-and-mouth disease. The Veterinary journal. Vol. 158 Page 6-13 
Bartley L.M., Donnelly C.A., Anderson R.M. 2002. Review of foot-and-mouth disease virus survival 
in animal excretions and on fomites. Veterinary record. Vol. 151 Page 667-669 
Baskin Y. 1998. Home on the range. Bioscience. Vol. 48 Page 245 
Bastos A.D.S., Boshoff C.I., Keet D.F., Bengis R.G., Thomson G.R. 2000. Natural transmission of 
foot-and-mouth disease virus between African buffalo (Syncerus caffer) and impala (Aepyceros 
melampus) in Kruger National Park, South Africa. Epidemiology and Infection. Vol. 124 Page 
591-598 
Baubet et al. 1998 in Damhuis A., Snijdelaar M., van Klink E. 2004. Classical swine fever in wild 
boar. The veterinary risks for the Dutch pig population due to the presence of wild boar in the 
pig-free zone in the ecological network. Ede, EC-LNV Report nr. 2004/259 (in Dutch) 
Beard C.W. and Easterday B.C. 1964. Aerosol transmission of Hog Cholera. Cornell Veterinarian. 
Vol. 55 Page 630-636 
Benard H.J., Stärk K.D.C., Morris R.S., Pfeiffer D.U., Moser H. 1999. The 1997-1998 classical 
swine fever epidemic in The Netherlands – survival analysis. Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 
Vol. 42 Page 235-248 
Bengis, R G, R A Kock and J. Fischer, 2002. Infectious animal diseases: the wildlife/ livestock 
interface. Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz. vol 21 (1): 53-65 
Blanchfield J.R. 1998. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) – a review. International Journal 
of Food Science and Technology. Vol. 33 Page 81-97 
Bouma A., Dekker A., de Jong M.C.M.2004. No foot-and-mouth disease virus transmission 
between individually housed claves. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol 98 Page 29-36 
Brugh M., Foster J.W., Hayes F.A. 1964. Studies on the comparative susceptibility of wild 
European and domestic swine to Hog Cholera. Journal of American Veterinary Research. Vol. 
25 Page 1124-1127 
Campbell N.A., Reece J.B., Mitchell L.G. 1999. Chapter 18: Microbial models: the genetics of 
viruses and bacteria. In Campbell N.A., Reece J.B., Mitchell L.G. Biology. 5th edition. 
Amsterdam, Addison-Wesley, an imprint of Addison Wesley Longman. Page 319-343 
Chapin et al. 1939 in Edwards S. 2000. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. 





Chenut G., Saintilan A-F., Burger C., Rosenthal F., Cruciere C., Picard M., Bruyere V., Albina E. 
1999. Oral immunisation of swine with a classical swine fever vaccine (Chinese strain) and 
transmission studies in rabbits and sheep. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol 64 Page 265-276 
Christensen L.S., Mortensen S., Botner A., Strandbygaard B.S., Ronsholt L., Hendriksen C.A. 
Andersen J.B. 1993. Further evidence of long distance airborne transmission of Aujeszky’s 
disease (pseudorabies) virus. Veterinary Record. Vol. 132 Page 317-321 
Clarke C. 1998. Between the bullets and bison. Earth Island Journal. Vol. 13 Page 21 
Cottral G.E., Cox B.F., Baldwin D.E. 1960. The survival of Foot-and-mouth disease virus in cured 
and uncured meat. American Journal of Veterinary Research. Vol. 21 Page 288-297 
Cox S.J., Barnett P.V., Dani P., Salt J.S. 1999. Emergency vaccination of sheep against foot-and-
mouth disease: protection against disease and reduction in contact transmission. Vaccine. Vol. 
17 Page 1858-1868 
Crauwels A.P.P., Nielen M., Elbers A.R.W., Stegeman J.A., Tielen M.J.M. 2003. Neighbourhood 
infections of classical swine fever during the 1997-1998 epidemic in The Netherlands. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine. Vol. 61 Page 263-277 
Cromsigt J.P.G.M. 2001. Domestic or wild: different ways of dealing with veterinarian aspects of 
large herbivores. Large Herbivore Foundation, Internal report. 
Cromsigt J.P.G.M., Dijkstra V.A.A., Wansink D., van Wieren S.E. 2001. Estimating the quality of 
the Dutch mammal populations. RIVM, unpublished report.  
Cromsigt J.P.G.M. 2003. Large herbivores on the move… a ghost from the past or an 
indispensable element of the future Eurasian landscape? Large Herbivore Foundation, Internal 
report. 
Cunningham A.A. 1996. Disease risks of wildlife translocations. Conservation Biology. Vol. 10 
Page 349-353 
Cunningham R.R. 2001. FMD control strategies. Veterinary Record. Vol. 18 Page 514  
Dahle J. and Liess B. 1995. Comparative study with cloned classical swine fever virus strain 
ALFORT and GLENTORF: clinical, pathological, virological and serological findings in weaner 
pigs. Wiener Tierärtztliche Monaatschrift. Vol. 82 Page 232-238 
Damhuis A., Snijdelaar M., van Klink E. 2004. Classical swine fever in wild boar. The veterinary 
risks for the Dutch pig population due to the presence of wild boar in the pig-free zone in the 
ecological network. Ede, EC-LNV Report nr. 2004/259 (in Dutch) 
Dawe P.S., Sorensen K., Ferris N.P., Barnett I.T.R., Armstrong R.M., Knowles N.J. 1994. 
Experimental transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus from carrier African buffalo 
(Syncerus caffer) to cattle in Zimbabwe. Veterinary Record. Vol. 134 Page 211-215 
Dawson et al. 1914 in Hughes R.W. and Gustafson D.P. 1960. Some factors that may influence 
Hog Cholera transmission. American Journal of Veterinary Research. Vol. 21 Page 464-471 
DEFRA, 2003. New EU directive on community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth 
disease (fmd), downloaded March 2005 from 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/directive/background_directive.pdf 
DEFRA, 2004. Contingency Plan Foot and Mouth Disease, version 4.0. Downloaded March 2005 
from http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/contingency/contplan.pdf 
Dekker L.J.M. and Elbers A.R.W. 2000. Sero-surveillance of notifiable diseases in wild boar in the 
Netherlands. Tijdschrift voor Diergeneeskunde. Vol. 125 Page 2-4 (in Dutch) 
Depner K., Bauer Th., Liess B. 1992. Thermal and pH stability of pestiviruses. Rev. sci. tech. Off. 
int. Epiz. Vol. 11 Page 885-893 
Depner K.R., Müller T., Lane E., Staubach C., Teuffert J. 2000. Transient classical swine fever 
virus infection in wild boar piglets partially protected by maternal antibodies. Deutsche 
Tierärtzliche Wocheschrift. Vol. 107 Page 66-68 
Depner K.R., Bouma A., Koenen F., Klinkenberg D., Lange E., de Smit H., Vanderhallen H. 2001. 
Classical swine fever (CSF) marker vaccine. Trail II. Challenge study in pregnant sows 
(abstract). Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 83 Page 107-120  
De Smit A.J., Bouma A., Terpstra C., van Oirschot J.T. 1999. Transmssion of Classical swine fever 
virus by artificial insemination. Veterninary Microbiology. Vol. 67 Page 239-249 
Dewulf J., Laevens H., Koenen F., Mintiens K., de Kruif A. 2000. Airborne transmission of classical 
swine fever virus under experimental conditions. Veterinary record. Vol. 147 Page 735-738 
Dewulf J., Laevens H., Koenen F., Mintiens K., de Kuif A. 2001. Evaluation of the potential of dogs, 
cats and rats to spread classical swine fever disease virus. Veterinary Record. Vol. 149 Page 
212-213 
Dewulf J., Laevens H., Koenen F., Mintiens K., de Kuif A. 2001b. An experimental infection with 





antibody response and effect on gestation (abstract). Journal of Veterinary Medicine, Series B. 
Vol. 48 Page 583 
Dewulf J., Laevens H., Koenen F., Mintiens K., de Kuif A. 2002. An E2 sub-unit marker vaccine 
does not prevent horizontal or vertical transmission of classical swine fever virus. Vaccine. Vol. 
20 Page 86-91 
Dewulf J., Laevens H., Koenen F., Mintiens K., de Kuif A. 2002b. An experimental infection to 
investigate the indirect transmission of classical swine fever virus by excretions of infected pigs. 
Journal of Veterinary Medicine, Series B. Vol. 49 Page 452 
Donaldson A.I., Hermans K.A.J., Parker J., Sellers R.F. 1970. Further investigation on the airborne 
excretion of foot-and-mouth disease virus. Journal of Hygiene. Vol. 68 Page 557-564 
Donaldson A.I. 1972. The influence of relative Humidity on the aerosol stability of different strains 
of foot-and-mouth disease virus suspended in saliva. Journal of General Virology. Vol. 15 Page 
25-33 
Donaldson A.I. and Ferris N.P. 1975. The survival of foot-and-mouth disease virus in open air 
conditions. Journal of Hygiene. Vol. 74 Page 409-415 
Donaldson A.I. 1979. Airborne foot-and-mouth disease. Veterinary Bulletin. Vol. 49 Page 653-659  
Donaldson A.I., Gloster J., Harvey L.D.J., Deans D.H. 1982. Use of prediction models to forecast 
and analyse airborne spread during the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Brittany, Jersey 
and Isle of Wight in 1981. Veterinary Record. Vol. 110 Page 53-57 
Donaldson A.I. 1986. Aerobiology of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD): an outline and recent 
advances. Rev. sci. tech. Off.int. Epiz. Vol. 5 Page 315-321 
Donaldson A.I. 1987. Foot-and-mouth disease: the principal features. Irish Veterinary Journal. Vol. 
41 Page 325-327 
Donaldson A.I. and Alexandersen S. 2001. Relative resistance of pigs to infection by natural 
aerosols of FD virus. Veterinary record. Vol. 148 Page 600-602 
Donaldson A.I., Alexandersen S., Sørensen J.H., Mikkelsen T. 2001. Relative risk of uncontrollable 
(airborne) spread of FMD by different species. Veterinary record. Vol. 148 Page 602-604 
Dorset et al. 1919 in Hughes R.W. and Gustafson D.P. 1960. Some factors that may influence Hog 
Cholera transmission. American Journal of Veterinary Research. Vol. 21 Page 464-471 
Dutch government. 23 April 2003. Press release (in Dutch). Accessed  September 20, 2004 at 
http://www.regering.nl/actueel/nieuwsarchief/2003/04April/23/42_16334.jsp 
Dutta P.K., Sarma G., Das S.K. 1983. Foot-and-mouth disease in Indian buffaloes. Veterinary 
Record. Vol. 133 Page 134 
Edgar et al. 1949 in Edwards S. 2000. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. 
Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 175-181 
Edwards S. 2000. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. Veterinary Microbiology. 
Vol. 73 Page 175-181 
Edwards S., Fukusho A., Lefévre P-C., Lipowski A., Pejsak Z., Roehe P., Westergaard J. 2000. 
Classical swine fever: the global situation. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 103-119 
Elbers A.R.W., Dekker A., Dekkers L.J.M. 2003. Serosurveillance of wild deer and wild boar after 
the epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease in the Netherlands in 2001. Veterinary Record. Vol. 
153 Page 678-681  
Ellis et al. 1977 in Terpstra C. 1987. Epizootiology of swine fever. The Veterinary Quarterly. Vol. 9 
Supplement 1 Page 50S-60S  
European Commission, DG Sanco,1999. Classical Swine Fever. Downloaded March 2005 from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scah/out24_en.pdf 
European Commission, 2004. Global conference on animal welfare: an OIE initiative. Paris, 23–25 
February 2004. Proceedings.  Luxemburg. ISBN 92-894-6614-6 
Ferguson N.M., Donnelly C.A., Anderson R.M. 2001. The foot-and-mouth epidemic in Great 
Britain: pattern of spread and impact of interventions. Science. Vol. 292 Page 1155-1161 
Ferrari et al. 1991 in Laddomada A., Patta C., Oggiano A., Caccia A., Ruiu A., Cossu P., Firinu A. 
1994. Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Sardinia: a serological survey of wild boar and 
comparison with African swine fever. Veterinary Record. Vol. 134 Page 183-187 
Forman A.J. and Gibbs E.P.J. 1974. Studies with foot-and-mouth disease virus in British deer 
(Red, Fallow and Roe) I. Clinical disease. Journal of Comparative Pathology. Vol. 84 Page 215-
220 
Forman A.J., Gibbs E.P.J., Baber D.J., Herniman K.A.J., Barnett I.T. 1974. Studies with foot-and-
mouth disease virus in British deer (Red, Fallow and Roe) II. Recovery of virus and serological 
response. Journal of Comparative Pathology. Vol. 84 Page 221-229 





Fritzemeier J., Teuffert J., Grieser-Wilke I., Staubach Ch., Schlüter H., Moennig V. 2000. 
Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Germany in the 1990s. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 
77 Page 29-41 
Gailiunas P. and Cottral G.E. 1967. Survival of foot-and-mouth disease virus in bovine hides. 
American Journal of Veterinary Research. Vol. 28 Page 1047-1053 
Gibbs E.P.J., Herniman K.A.J., Lawman M.J.P., Sellers R.F. 1975. Foot-and-mouth disease in 
British deer: transmission of virus to cattle, sheep and deer. Veterinary Record. Vol. 96 Page 
558-563 
Gibbs E.P.J., Herniman K.A.J., Lawman M.J.P. 1975b. Studies with foot-and-mouth disease virus 
in British deer (Muntjac and Sika): clinical disease, recovery of virus and serological response. 
Journal of Comparative Pathology. Vol. 84 Page 361-366 
Gibson C.F. and Donaldson A.I. 1986. Exposure of sheep to natural aerosol of foot-and-mouth 
disease virus. Research in Veterinary Science. Vol. 41 Page 45-49 
Gleeson L.J. 2002. Review of the status of foot and mouth disease in South-East Asia and 
approaches to control and eradication. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 465-475 
Gloster J. 2004 (in press). New directions: airborne transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus. 
Atmosphere Environment. Vol. 38 Page 503-505 
Gloster J., Champion H.J., Sorensen J.H., Mikkelsen T., Ryall D.B., Astrup P., Alexandersen S., 
Donaldson A.I. 2003. Airborne transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus from Burnside 
Farm, Heddon-on-the-wall, Northumberland, during the 2001 epidemic in the United Kingdom. 
Veterinary Record. Vol. 152 Page 525-533 
Gloster J., Sellers R.F., Donaldson A.I. 1982. Long distance transport of foot-and-mouth disease 
virus over sea. Veterinary Record. Vol. 110 Page 47-52 
Gomes I., Ramalho A.K., Augé de Mello P. 1997. Infectivity assays of foot-and-mouth disease 
virus: contact transmission between cattle and buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) in the early stages of 
infection. Veterinary record. Vol. 140 Page 43-47 
González C., Pijoan C., Ciprian A., Correa P., Mendoza S. 2001. The effect of vaccination with the 
PAV-250 strain Classical Swine fever (CSF) virus on the airborne transmission of CSF virus. 
Virology. Vol. 63 Page 991-996 
Graves H.B. 1984. Behavior and ecology of wild and feral swine (Sus scrofa). Journal of Animal 
Science. Vol. 58 Page 482-492 
Griffin J.M. and O’Reilly P.J. 2003. Epidemiology and control of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
disease in the Republic of Ireland in 2001. Veterinary Record. Vol. 152 Page 705-712 
Haas B., Ahl R., Bohm R., Strauch D. 1995. Inactivation of viruses in liquid manure. Rev. Sci. 
Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 14 Page 435-445 
Haigh J.C., Mackintosh C.,Griffin F. 2002. Viral, parasitic and prion diseases of farmed deer and 
bison. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 219-248 
Have 1984 in Edwards S. 2000. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. Veterinary 
Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 175-181 
Hedger R.S. and Concy J.B. 1985. Transmission of foot-and-mouth disease from African buffalo 
virus carriers to bovines. Veterinary record. Vol. 117 Page 205 
Hugh-Jones M.E. and Wright P.B. 1970. Studies on the 1967-8 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic. 
The relation of weather to the spread of disease. Journal of Hygiene. Vol. 68 Page 253-271 
Hughes R.W. and Gustafson D.P. 1960. Some factors that may influence Hog Cholera 
transmission. American Journal of Veterinary Research. Vol. 21 Page 464-471 
Jones R., Kelly L., French N., England T., Livesey C., Wollridge M. 2004. Quantitative estimates of 
the risk of new outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease as a result of burning pyres. Veterinary 
record. Vol. 154 Page 161-165 
Kaden et al. 1999 in Kaden V., Lange E., Fischer U., Strebelow G. 2000. Oral immunisation of wild 
boar against classical swine fever: evaluation of the first field study in Germany. Veterinary 
Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 239-252 
Kaden V., Lange E., Fischer U., Strebelow G. 2000. Oral immunisation of wild boar against 
classical swine fever: evaluation of the first field study in Germany. Veterinary Microbiology. 
Vol. 73 Page 239-252 
Kaden V., Schurig U., Steyer H. 2001. Oral immunization of pigs against classical swine fever. 
Course of the disease and virus transmission after simultaneous vaccination and infection. Acta 
Virologica. Vol. 45 Page 23-29 
Kaden V., Lange E., Steyer H., Bruer W., Langner Ch. 2003. Role of birds in transmission of 





Kar B.C., Hota N., Acharjyo L.N. 1983. Occurrence of foot-and-mouth disease among some wild 
ungulates in captivity. Indian Veterinary Journal. Vol. 60 Page 237-239 
Kirkwood J.K. and Sainsbury A.W. 1996. Ethics of interventions for the welfare of free-living wild 
animals. Animal welfare. Vol. 5 Page 235-243 
Kitching, R.P, 2002. Future research on foot and mouth disease. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 
21: 885-889 
Kitching R.P. and Hughes G.J. 2002. Clinical variation in foot and mouth disease: sheep and 
goats. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 505-512 
Klaver I., Keulartz J., van den Belt H., Gremmen B. 2002. Born to be Wild: A pluralistic Ethics 
concerning introduced large herbivores in the Netherlands. Environmental Ethics. Vol. 24 Page 
3-21 
Klinkenberg D. 2003. Mathematical epidemiology and the control of classical swine fever virus. 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Utrecht. ISBN 9039333173, Ponsen en Looijen bv, Wageningen. 
KNMI 2004, Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute developed the World Climate Information (WKI) 
version 2.00 (last updated 20 nov. 1998) http://www.knmi.nl/organis/wm/kd/en/kd_software.html  
Kubin 1967 in Edwards S. 2000. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. Veterinary 
Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 175-181 
Kuiters A.T., Mohren G.M.J., van Wieren S.E. 1996. Ungulates in temperate forest ecosystems. 
Forest ecology and Management. Vol. 88 Page 1-5 
Laddomada A. 2000. Incidence and control of CSF in wild boar in Europe. Veterinary Microbiology. 
Vol. 73 Page 121-130 
Laddomada A., Patta C., Oggiano A., Caccia A., Ruiu A., Cossu P., Firinu A. 1994. Epidemiology 
of classical swine fever in Sardinia: a serological survey of wild boar and comparison with 
African swine fever. Veterinary Record. Vol. 134 Page 183-187 
Laevens H., Koenen F., Deluyker H., Berkvens D., de Kruif A. 1998. An experimental infection with 
classifal swine fever virus in weaner pigs. Veterinary quarterly. Vol. 20 Page 41-45 
Leforban, Y. 2002. How predictable were the outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in Europe in 
2001 and is vaccination the answer? Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol 21 (3), 549-556 
Leforban Y. and Gerbier G. 2002. Review of the status of foot and mouth disease and approach to 
control/eradication in Europe and Central Asia. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 477-
492 
Leunen and Strobbe 1977 in Terpstra C. 1987. Epizootiology of swine fever. The Veterinary 
Quarterly. Vol. 9 Supplement 1 Page 50S-60S 
Liess B. 1987. Pathogenesis and epidemiology of Hog cholera. Annuelle Recherche Veterinaire. 
Vol. 18 Page 139-145 
Loan R.W. and Strom M.M. 1968. Propagation and transmission of Hog Cholera virus in 
nonporcine hosts. American Journal of Veterinary Research. Vol. 19 Page 807-811 
Loepelmann and Dedek 1987 in Van Campen H., Frölich K., Hofman M. 2001. Pestivirus 
infections. In: Williams E.S. and Baker I.K. Infectious diseases of wild mammals, 3rd edition. 
Iowa State University, Ames. Page 232-244 
Martin D. 2004 Cleveland Hedgehog Preservation Society. Accessed August 25, 2004 at 
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/donald.martin/CHPS/facts.htm  
Maust M. 2002. Introduced Species Summary Project: Norway rat (Rattus norvegicus). Accessed 
August 25, 2004 at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/cerc/danoff-
burg/invasion_bio/inv_spp_summ/Rattus_norvegicus.html 
Macpherson C.N.L. 1995. The effect of transmhumance on the epidemiology of animal diseases. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine. Vol. 25 Page 213-224 
Mead C.J. 1968. Disease related to viruses: Birds as vectors of foot-and-mouth virus. Veterinary 
Annual. Vol. 9 Page 70-75 
Meyer et al. 1981 in Terpstra C. 1987. Epizootiology of swine fever. The Veterinary Quarterly. Vol. 
9 Supplement 1 Page 50S-60S 
Miller L.D., Dowing D.R., Morgan N.O. 1974. Transmission of Hog Cholera virus by flies: recovery 
of virus from flies following exposure to infective blood. Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of 
the US Animal Health Association. Vol. 78 Page 324-330 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality, 2002. Beleidsdraaiboek Mond en Klauwzeer. The 
Hague. 
Moennig V. 2000. Introduction to classical swine fever: virus, disease and control policy. Veterinary 
Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 93-102 
Mörner, T, D.L. Obendorf, M. Artois and M.H. Woodford, 2002. Surveillance and monitoring of 





Musser J.M.B. 2004. A practitioner’s primer on foot-and-mouth disease. Journal of American 
Veterinary Medicine Accosiation. Vol. 8 Page 1261-1268 
OIE/ FAO, 2001. International Scientific Conference on Foot and Mouth Disease, 17-18 April, 
Paris. Paris, Rome, 200. 
OIE 2002. Disease card of Foot and Mouth Disease. OIE, www.oie.int  
OIE 2002bis. Disease card of Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera). OIE, www.oie.int  
OIE 2004.  Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 12th edition, Paris. 
OIE, 2004bis, Report of the meeting of the OIEworking group on wildlife diseases. Paris, 9 – 11 
february 2004. http://www.oie.int/downld/WG/2004/A_WGW2004.pdf 
OmniShift 2004. Deer. Accessed August 25, 2004 at http://www.omnishift.net/DeerMain.html 
Pagnini et al. 1984 in Edwards S. 2000. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. 
Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 175-181 
Paling R.W., Jessett D.M., Heath B.R. 1979. The occurrence of infectious diseases in mixed 
farming of domestic herbivores, including camels, in Kenya. I. Viral diseases: serological survey 
with special reference to foot-and-mouth disease. Journal of Wildlife Diseases. Vol. 15 Page 
351-359 
Parker J. 1971. Presence and inactivation of foot-and-mouth disease virus in animal faeces. 
Veterinary Record. Vol. 88 Page 659-662 Laos. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 
663-673 
Pluimers, F.H., A.M. Akkerman, P. van der Wei, A. Dekker and A. Bianchi, 2002. Lessons from the 
foot and mouth disease outbreak in the Netherlands in 2001. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 
21, p 711-721 
Prost and Bojarski 1967 in Edwards S. 2000. Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever 
virus. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 175-181 
Ressang 1973 in Terpstra C. 1987. Epizootiology of swine fever. The Veterinary Quarterly. Vol. 9 
Supplement 1 Page 50S-60S 
Rimmelzwaan G.F., de Jong J.C., Bestebroer T.M., van Loon A.M., Claas E.C.J., Fouchier R.A.M., 
Osterhaus A.D.M.E. 2001. Antigenic and genetic characterization of swine influenza A (H1N1) 
viruses isolated from pneumonia patients in The Netherlands. Virology. Vol. 282 Page 301-306 
Roberts M. 1995. Evaluation of the optimal size of restriction zones in disease control with 
particular reference to classical swine fever. Proceedings of the Society for veterinary 
epidemiology and preventive medicine, Reading, 1995. Page 119-130  
Sakamoto K. and Yoshida K. 2002. Recent outbreak of foot and mouth disease in countries of east 
Asia. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 21 Page 459-463 
Salt J.S., Barnett P.V., Dani P., Williams L. 1998. Emergency vaccination of pigs against foot-and-
mouth disease: protection against disease and reduction in contact transmission. Vaccine. Vol. 
16 Page 746-754 
Samara S.I. and Pinto A.A. 1983. Detection of foot-and-mouth disease carriers among water 
buffalo (Bubalus bubalus) after an outbreak of the disease in cattle. Veterinary Record. Vol. 113 
Page 472-473 
Sarma G., Das S.K., Dutta P.K. 1983. Outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in deer in the Assam 
state zoo. Veterinary Record. Vol. 113 Page 420-421 
Schnyder M., Stärk K.D.C., Vanzetti T., Salman M.D., Thür B., Schleiss W., Griot C. 2002. 
Epidemiology and control of an outbreak of classical swine fever in wild boar in Switzerland. 
Veterinary Record. Vol. 150 Page 102-109 
Shope 1958 in Hughes R.W. and Gustafson D.P. 1960. Some factors that may influence Hog 
Cholera transmission. American Journal of Veterinary Research. Vol. 21 Page 464-471 
Sellers R.F. 1971. Quantitative aspects of the spread of foot and mouth disease. Veterinary 
Bulletin. Vol. 41 Page 431-439 
Sellers R.P. and Gloster J. 1980. The Northumberland epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease, 1966. 
Journal of Hygiene. Vol. 85 Page 129-140 
Sellers R.F. and Parker J. 1969. Airborne excretion of foot-and-mouth disease virus. Journal of 
Hygiene. Vol. 67 Page 671-677 
Sharma S.K. 1981. Foot-and-mouth disease in sheep and goats. Veterinary Research Journal. Vol. 
4 Page 1-21  
Sharma S.K., Singh P.P., Murty D.K. 1981. Foot and mouth disease in sheep and goats: an 
iceberg infection. Indian Veterinary Journal. Vol. 58 Page 925-928 
Slavin G. 1938. The resistence of the swine fever virus to physical agencies and chemical 





Smith R.L. and Smith T.M. 1998. Chapter 17: Parasitism and Mutualism. In: Smith R.L. and Smith 
T.M. Elements of Ecology. 4th edition. Amsterdam, The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing 
Company, an imprint of Addison Wesley Longman. Page 208 –223  
Staubach et al. 1997 in Fritzemeier J., Teuffert J., Grieser-Wilke I., Staubach Ch., Schlüter H., 
Moennig V. 2000. Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Germany in the 1990s. Veterinary 
Microbiology. Vol. 77 Page 29-41 
Stephenson R.S. and Davies H.E. 2001. FMD control strategies. Veterinary Record. Vol. 17 Page 
547 
Stewart W.C., Carbrey E.A., Jenney E.W., Kresse J.I., Snijder M.I., Wessman S.J. 1975. 
Transmission of Hog Cholera virus by mosquitoes. American Journal of Veterinary Research. 
Vol. 36 Page 611-614 
Sutmoller, P. and R. Casas Olascoaga, 2003. The risks posed by the importation of animals 
vaccinated against foot and mouth disease and products derived from vaccinated animals: a 
review. Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol 22 (3): 823-835 
Sutmoller P. and Vose D.J. 1997. Contamination of animal products: minimum pathogen dose 
required to initiate infection. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol 16 Page 30-32 
Sutmoller P. and Wrathall A.E. 1997. A quantitative assessment of risk of transmission of foot-and-
mouth disease, bluetongue, and vesicular stomatitis by embryo transfer in cattle. Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine. Vol. 32 Page 111-132 
Sutmoller P., Thomson G.R., Hargreaves S.K., Foggin C.M., Anderson E.C. 2000. The foot-and-
mouth disease risk by African buffalo within wildlife conservancies to cattle industry of 
Zimbabwe. Preventive Veterinary Medicine. Vol. 44 Page 43-60 
Schwarte 1959 in Terpstra C. 1987. Epizootiology of swine fever. The Veterinary Quarterly. Vol. 9 
Supplement 1 Page 50S-60S 
Terpstra C. 1987. Epizootiology of swine fever. The Veterinary Quarterly. Vol. 9 Supplement 1 
Page 50S-60S 
Terpstra C. 1988. Epizootiology of hog cholera. In: Liess B. (ed.) Classical swine fever and related 
infections. Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, Dordrecht, Lancaster. Page 201-216.  
Thomson G.R., Vosloo W., Esterhuysen J.J., Bengis R.G. 1992. Maintenance of foot and mouth 
disease viruses in buffalo (Syncerus caffer Sparrman, 1779) Southern Africa. Rev. Sci. Tech. 
Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 11 Page 1097-1107 
Thomson G.R. 1995. Overview of foot and mouth disease in Southern Africa. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. 
Int. Epiz. Vol. 14 Page 503-520 
Thomson G.R., Benig R.C., Brown C.C. 2001. Picarnovirus infections. In: Williams E.S. and Baker 
I.K. Infectious diseases of wild mammals, 3rd edition. Iowa State University, Ames. Page 119-
130  
Thomson G.R., Vosloo W., Bastos A.D.S. 2003. Foot and mouth disease in wildlife. Virus 
Research. Vol. 91 Page 145-161 
Tidwell M.A., Dean W.D., Tidwell M.A., Combs G.P., Anderson D.W., Cowart W.O., Axtell R.C. 
1972. Transmission of Hog Cholera virus by horseflies (Tabanidae: Diptera). American Journal 
of Veterinary Research. Vol. 33 Page 615-622 
Uttenthal Å., Le Potier M.-F., Romero L., De Mia G.M., Floeger-Niesmann G.2001. Classical swine 
fever (CSF) marker vaccine. Trail I. Challenge studies in weaner pigs (abstract). Veterinary 
Microbiology. Vol. 83 Page 85-106 
Van Campen H., Frölich K., Hofman M. 2001. Pestivirus infections. In: Williams E.S. and Baker I.K. 
Infectious diseases of wild mammals, 3rd edition. Iowa State University, Ames. Page 232-244  
Vandeputte J. and Chappuis G. 1999. Classical swine fever: The European experience and a 
guide for infected areas. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz. Vol. 18 Page 638-647 
Van Oirschot J.T. and Terpstra C. 1977. A congenital persistent swine fever infection. I. Clinical 
and virological observations. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 2 Page 121-132 
Van Oirschot J.T. 1979. Experimental production of congenital persistent swine fever infections. I. 
Clinical, pathological and virological observations. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 4 Page 117-
132 
Van Oirschot J.T. 1999 in Moennig V. 2000. Introduction to classical swine fever: virus, disease 
and control policy. Veterinary Microbiology. Vol. 73 Page 93-102 
Vosloo W., Bastos A.D., Kirkbride E., Esterhuysen J.J., Janse van Rensburg D., Bengis R.G., Keet 
D.W., Thomson G.R. 1996. Persistent infection of African buffalo (Syncerus caffer) with SAT-
type foot-and-mouth disease viruses: rate of fixation of mutations, antigenic change and 





Wardrope D.D. and Windsor R.S. 2001. FMD control strategies. Veterinary Record. Vol. 17 Page 
547 
Wells D.L., Hopfensperger D.J., Arden N.H., Harmon M.W., Davis J.P., Tipple M.A.m 
Schoneberger L.B. 1991. Swine influenza virus infections. Transmission from ill pigs to humans 
at a Wisconsin agricultural fair and subsequent probable person-to-person transmission. The 
Journal of American Medical Association. Vol. 265 Page 478 
Wentink G.H., Frankena K., Bosch J.C., Vandehoek J.E.D., van den Berg Th. 2000. Prevention of 
disease transmission by semen in cattle. Livestock Production Science. Vol. 62 Page 207-220 
Williams D.R. and Matthews D. 1988. Outbreaks of classical swine fever in Great Britain in 1986. 
Veterinary record. Vol. 122 Page 479-483 
Wittmann G. 1990. The virus carrier state in foot-and-mouth disease (abstract). Berliner München 
Tierärtzliche Wochenschrift. Vol. 103 Page 145-150 
Wood P., Wright G., Rowe R., Smith H., Artingstall C., Hinds M., Clapp J., Lampard R., Knott T., 








List of Informants 
Bouma, Annemarie  Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Utrecht University,  
the Netherlands. 
Dekker, Aldo   Wageningen University and Research centre (WUR),  
the Netherlands. 
De Roder, Frank State Forestry Management (Staatsbosbeheer), 
  the Netherlands   
Heesterbeek, Hans (J.A.P.)  Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Utrecht University,  
The Netherlands. 
Kita, Jerzy    Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Warsaw Agricultural University,  
Poland. 
Montizaan, Margriet   Royal Dutch Hunters Society (KNJV),  
the Netherlands. 
Orsel, Karin    Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Utrecht University,  
the Netherlands. 
Van Klink, Ed (E.G.M.) Expertise Centre, Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality, 
  the Netherlands 
 
Diseases formerly classified as List A 
 
OIE code LIST A DISEASES 
A010 Foot and mouth disease 
A020 Vesicular stomatitis 
A030 Swine vesicular disease 
A040 Rinderpest 
A050 Peste des petits ruminants 
A060 Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia 
A070 Lumpy skin disease 
A080 Rift Valley fever 
A090 Bluetongue 
A100 Sheep pox and goat pox 
A110 African horse sickness 
A120 African swine fever 
A130 Classical swine fever 
A150 Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
A160 Newcastle disease 
 
(Source: OIE, 2005. www.oie.int/hs2/report.asp) 
